七二七跌势中的一些看法和分享

origen

哈，ee兄弟又从另一角度切入整个景象，让我们对事态内部有更多的了解。赞！
很高兴有更多的朋友加入分享心得！

糊涂

dreamer55兄好精辟的见解，糊涂受益良多。

无巧不成书，其实在dreamer55兄还没帖此帖前(马后炮)，糊涂已把20%的资金撤出股市来观望后市走向，投资策略与dreamer兄大同小异。差别在于糊涂会逐渐把长期投资主力转移至短期的投机，期望能够在hit and go 的market中分到一份羹；dreamer兄的文章给于糊涂很大的助益，让糊涂能够有更明确的方向去执行接下来的投资策略。

糊涂许久都没见到那么好的文章，所以特给dreamer55兄加分以表敬意。

呵呵，囤粮准备过冬正是糊涂近期投资策略的重点。
糊涂投资的终极目标是达到财务自由；在未达到此目标前，糊涂自会更加爱惜手中的精兵，决不参与没有把握的战役。

春江水暖鴨先知

原帖由 ee33 于 29-7-2007 02:02 PM 发表
我说说七二七和二二八KLSE跌势有何不同。。。

1。二二八之前的热度比七二七之前为高。
2。二二八之前的散户参与度远比七二七之前为高。
3。二二八之前的热度由廉价小型股带动，七二七之前的热度由medium c ...

精彩精彩！精辟的見解。

sunday365

我們的股市會崩嗎？

推薦給朋友    列印

updated:2007-07-28 18:41:21 MYT

 股友擔心的事，終於發生了。那就是價高市危的全球股市老大─美國股市週四暴露次級房貸問題惡化的缺口，逼使投資者采取行動進行套利而重挫猛瀉，全球股市也為之惊慌失措，紛紛告急隨著猛跌，触發全球小股災。

週五隔夜美國股市跌勢未止，使3個主要指數再受挫跌，道瓊斯工業指數再滑208.10點，或是1.54%。看來股友擔心的事還沒有完全了結，而它對我們的股市衝擊又如何？


若說美國股市重跌，不會影響到大馬股市後市表現，那只是說對一半，先決條件是小股災沒有進一步惡化，本地股市還有回揚潛能。

大馬近年來即開始積極推動國內發展計劃，刺激國內需求推動經濟，以圖平衡緩衝全球經濟特別是美國經濟可能放緩的衝擊，實行靠別人的同時也要靠自己。

目前大馬股市還沒有達到“瘋狂失理智”的地步。股友被10年前金融風暴帶來的母熊抓到的傷口痕跡猶新，心有餘悸之故，近年無視區域同儕牛氣衝天，早在數年前即開跑攀高的事實，大馬股友卻還是小心翼翼，往往淺嘗即止，稍為有點利潤，就逃之夭夭。

大馬股友深怕“井繩”真的再次變成“毒蛇”，如此一來，大馬成為區域股市牛氣最淡的股市，被視為循序漸進及具有韌力的保守派。

大馬經濟過去10年養精蓄銳小有成績，加上一些外資流入，外匯儲備相當丰厚，即使部份外資掉頭外流，可能會引一些不適的動蕩，相信還不至於完全消磨股市的韌力。

外圍因素方面，大馬經濟對美國的依賴已經逐漸減少，特別是多元化至全球未來經濟強國的中國，以及捨遠求近多靠些東盟的“兄弟”。失去美國一些貿易不打緊，其他來源可以彌補。不過，先決條件是美國這個洞不可太大。

大馬經濟還有雙油頂著半邊天，出路肯定不成問題，特別是要應付中國據說還有至少數十年榮景的需求，連最投機的美國基金都說她有80年牛市，所以雙油也至少可頂得住半邊股市。

綜合上述的一些前因後果，我們的股市要應付全球小股災，應是綽綽有餘。至於惡化演變成大股災，則是另當別論。

先說自已本身情況，大馬並不缺乏發展計劃，稍有看報紙財經版的人，可能都會如數家珍；如第9大馬計劃、東南西北的經濟發展走廊或是鐵軌大道、彭雪食水輸送大計、政府相關公司重組改革、北馬石油天然氣輸送管工程、還有更多的探油計劃等等，實是推動經濟與股市“催化劑”。

股友在憑豐富想像力勾勒出一張美景的同時，也無妨提出問號，就是上述計劃的執行能力如何，套句專家話語，就是所謂的“執行風險”。

有點令人期盼的，就是公務員大幅度加薪，聽說遲點可能還有花紅，相信有助提振“人民公僕”士氣，從而侍民如金，從善如流，可能會使執行風險降低，不過還得記得追縱跟進啊！

說到外圍因素；若是出現另一種情況，短期內美國股市繼續面對沉重賣壓，屋子過剩情況惡化，掀起惡性連鎖反應，相信大馬股市也難以倖免，因為全球泛濫游資將可能失序四處流竄填補回贖基金的大洞，作為高度依靠出口開放型的大馬經濟，將難以在動蕩中完全置身度外。

所以說，想要在大馬股市“趁低吸購”之前，還是有必要注意美國股市老大的最新發展，能夠如分析家勸告冷靜分析是最好，想得更多更細就更妙，縱然不易臆測大馬股市後市表現，至少可在出現任何狀況時，知道如何更好應對，不至於落入惊慌失措的窘境。 （星洲日報/財經講場•作者；李文龍•2007.07.28）

sunday365

Autumn Panics
A Calendar Phenomenon

Christopher Carolan

The crash of the Hong Kong stock market in October 1997, with its obvious parallels to similar events in the U.S. in 1987 and 1929, once again raises the specter of October as a dark and ominous month for stocks. Is it merely a coincidence that these three crashes all occurred in October? Is there a timing pattern among autumn panics useful to market participants? This article expands upon the observation, originally contained in Chapter 1 of the author’s book, The Spiral Calendar1, outlining the correlation between the lunar calendar and the stock market panics of 1929 and 1987. This paper examines how the 1997 Hong Kong panic conforms to that earlier model, as well as examines the great autumn panics of the 19th century. Finally, a look at the peculiar international character of panics, and its implications for the possible causes of these panics.


Definition of Terms


Panic: The focus of this article is on short-term equity market panics. The crashes of 1929 and 1987 are the obvious examples. I define these panics as one-to-three day, free-fall drops of approximately 20% in the major averages. The term "panic" is preferred over "crash" as the definition of panic stresses the suddenness and irrationality of the event. Panics were originally ascribed to the god Pan simply because there were no obvious fundamental causes for their occurrence.


Collapse: Collapse is used to signify the larger macro market decline lasting weeks or months within which the panic occurs. An example would be the Hong Kong panic of October 1997, occurring within the larger Asian equity and currency collapse that ran from July 1997 to January 1998.


Annual Lunar Calendar: The annual lunar calendar used here is based on the Babylonian calendar, which was the model for the later Jewish calendar. This annual lunar calendar labels the date of the first new moon following the spring equinox as month one, day one; or 1-1. The following date is 1-2. The date of the second new moon after the spring equinox is 2-1, etc... The difficulty with annual lunar calendars, and one of the reasons for their abandonment, is that the solar year does not have an even number of months. Thus, some years in an annual lunar calendar have 12 months, others 13. For our purposes, which focus on the Autumn months, this issue is inconsequential. All calculations use Eastern Standard Time to determine the dates of the lunar phases.





In 1992, this author demonstrated how the panic dates of "Black Tuesday," October 29, 1929, and "Black Monday," October 19, 1987 occurred on the same annual lunar calendar date, 7-28. [See Chapter 1 of The Spiral Calendar.] Additionally, the other similar points in the comparisons of those two years, the spring lows, summer highs and autumn failure highs all occurred within one day on the lunar calendar. Figure 1 shows those years in a chart aligned with the lunar calendar, where similar lunar dates are juxtaposed above each other. The panics are marked with arrows. The other similar features are denoted with dashed lines. The chart also includes Hong Kong’s Hang Seng index for the panic year 1997.

These price moves are extraordinarily large over a very short period of time. Are these panics the largest such declines, or do we selectively remember the October panics and forget those of other months? A scan of daily data of the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1915, the Hang Seng index from 1980, The Japanese Nikkei index from 1950, and the German DAX index from 1960 for the 10 largest, single-day percentage drops is shown in Table 1.



Seven of those ten declines were days associated with one of the three panics. Two of the others, the spring 1989 declines in the Hong Kong market, were tied to a fundamental news event, the Tiananmen crisis in China. The final entry is from the German market during the "mini-crash" of October 1989, an October event similar to the others, but smaller in magnitude. The point to stress here is that in their breadth and ferocity, these panics lie outside the boundaries of normal price action. There are no other comparable one-to-three day declines of this magnitude in the data. They represent the very largest percentage drops in the database. This is not normal market behavior. What else ties these events together? The panics occupy virtually identical positions on the annual lunar calendar.



Table 2 shows the percentage declines for each panic in the key four-day time span around the lows. The lunar dates 7-27 and 7-28 are the "dark days," encompassing the various Black Tuesdays of N.Y. in 1929 and Hong Kong in 1997, and the Black and Blue Mondays in N.Y. in 1987 and 1997 respectively. In each case, lunar date 7-28 marked the end of the panic and the next two days, 7-29 and 7-30 (or 8-1, some lunar months have 29 days, others 30) saw significant retracement rallies.



Table 3 groups the data into two-day segments and includes the percentage of these retracement rallies. This table shows the striking similarity of these panics and how that similarity conforms to the annual lunar calendar.



Table 4 pinpoints the precise timing of the panic lows on the lunar calendar. The timing from 1929 is gathered from the news accounts that described stock prices as rallying sharply off their lows in the last fifteen minutes of trading on Black Tuesday, October 29. The 1987 and 1997 times are from available databases for the Dow Industrials and are corrected to Eastern Standard Time. The table also shows the date and time of the nearest lunar phase, the eighth new moon on the annual lunar calendar, as well as the difference in hours between the stock market’s low and the moon’s phase. The timing of these three great panic lows is within twenty-four hours of each other. In other words, all three lows fall within the same one-half of one percent of the calendar year.

sunday365

A review of the Pre-1915 Autumn Panics


The Panic of 1907
The so-called panic of 1907 does not fit our short-term panic criteria. There was no market decline of approximately 20% in the span of one-to-three days. The largest, single-day declines were 3% in the Dow Jones Industrial Average during the collapse. There was a collapse and coincident banking panics, most of which occurred in October of that year. Sobel, in Panic on Wall Street2, describes the ending of the collapse. J.P Morgan put together his plan to save the banking system on November 3-5, 1907, 7-28 through 7-30 on the annual lunar calendar. After being closed for Election Day on November 5 (7-30), stocks rallied strongly on lunar 8-1. The crisis was over. The timing of the end of the crisis is consistent with the lunar panic model. The day Morgan realized the banking system was not going to fail, he put into motion a plan to save the banks, which ultimately arrested the decline. That day was lunar 7-28, the same date as the lows of the later 20th century panics.

The Crash of 1873
September 18 and 19, 1873 were labeled "Black Thursday" and "Black Friday" in the collapse of 1873. The Friday selling took prices of major stocks 5 to 25% percent below Thursday’s already collapsed levels. This panic was considered the greatest on Wall Street until 1929. The news accounts describe the same type of free fall and despair as the 20th century counterparts. The annual lunar calendar dates of "Black Thursday" and "Black Friday" were 6-27 and 6-28, one month earlier, but exactly the same lunar days as the 20th century examples. News accounts describe a temporary bottom late on Friday. Saturday, September 20 brought renewed selling and the closure of the exchange after a shortened two-hour trading day. The stock exchange remained closed for a week thereafter. Though on Monday September 22 prices rose sharply in trading in the streets. The timing of the 1873 Autumn panic is consistent with the 20th century results, though exactly one month earlier.

The Crash of 1857

The collapse of 1857 was not a stock market free-fall in the sense of the 20th century panics outlined above. It was a very sharp drop in stocks over a period of nine weeks, accompanied by a number of runs on banks, persistent pressure on the banking system, and sharply rising interest rates. Also, it was international in scope, a facet we’ll address later. Though the selling in the equity markets did not climax in a free-fall panic, the pressure on the banking system did, as the N.Y. banking panic broke out on October 13 and mayhem continued for two days thereafter. Sobel, in the Panic on Wall Street3, quotes George Strong writing on October 15. "Wall Street blue with collapse. Everything flaccid like a defunct Actina." On the annual lunar calendar, October 13 and 14, 1857 are 7-27 and 7-28, the same "dark days" as the 20th century examples.



Causation

The correlation between the annual lunar calendar and the timing of the three 20th century panics as well as the supportive data from the 19th century does not prove that an annual lunar calendar position is the cause of those panics. A few examples of anything cannot statistically prove a hypothesis. However, it should be realized that each occurrence is not a 50-50, or true/false proposition. If the Hong Kong panic had occurred on any of the 360 days of 1997 other than lunar 7-27, 7-28, 6-27, or 6-28; then this model would be effectively discredited. Yet the 1997 Hong Kong panic climaxed 5 hours after the timing of the 1987 panic and 20 hours after the 1929 panic on the lunar calendar.

Previous theories explaining panics have not fared well when the next panic came along. In the 19th century, it was widely believed that panics occurred in October specifically because banks’ cash positions were weakened as farmers were paid for the new crop. Yet today, agriculture makes up a much smaller fraction of the world economy than before, yet October panics are still with us. The Federal Reserve System was set up in the belief that if banking panics were prevented, stock market panics would cease to exist as well. That causal theory was disproved by the 1929 crash. The 1929 panic was blamed on low margin levels, yet 1987 happened anyway. In 1987, the finger was pointed at program trading. However, the 1997 panic occurred without any appreciable role by program traders.

The lunar calendar model of panics, alone among theories, not only survived the next panic intact, but its basic tenet was remarkably affirmed by the precise timing of the 1997 low.


The timings of financial collapses do not show a pattern. The 1997 Asian collapse began in July, while the crisis of 1987 and the collapse of 1857 began in August. The 1929 and 1873 examples began in September. Yet in each case, the start of the collapse did not result in immediate widespread panic. Those panics seem to wait for a particular time period on the calendar, the 27th and 28th days of the autumn lunar months, usually October, but in one instance September.

sunday365

The International Question

The international character of financial crises has been a difficult problem for those who have sought to ascribe causes to collapses and panics. Kindleberger, in Manias, Panics and Crashes writes, "Time and again, observers like Juggler, Mitchell and Morgenstern have observed that financial crises tend to be international, either running parallel from country to country or spreading by one means or another from the country where they originate to other countries.4" And "What is remarkable is that securities prices do the same even when only a few securities can be said to be truly international, that is, are traded on several markets, their prices joined by arbitrage. In 1929 all stock markets crashed simultaneously; the same was largely true in October 1987…It is striking that share prices behaved in parallel almost sixty years apart, even though share prices were thought not to have been integrated in the 1920s as they were in the 1980s.5"

The panics of 1987 and 1997 highlighted the international quality of panics. Traders the world over saw these markets dive and then rally in unison. In this wired world, that interconnection is not so extraordinary, though Kindleberger is surprised by the international nature of the 1929 collapse.

An examination of the 1857 collapse is more revealing. Kindleberger notes, "What is striking is the concentrated nature of the crises…Clapham observes that it broke out almost at the same moment in the United States, England, and Central Europe, and was felt in South America, South Africa and the Far East.6" Aside from the international nature of the macro collapse, the 1857 collapse affords a unique, controlled database of market behavior in the "dark days" of lunar 7-27 and 7-28 on two continents. In 1857, the Atlantic cable linked America with England by telegraph. In the early days of the collapse, the telegraph cable failed and all communication was done by ship for the remainder of the crisis. The London Times and The New York Times from the period leading up to and through the N.Y. banking panic provide striking evidence of two markets in distress. Wall Street began its rally from the depths of the collapse on October 13, 1857 (lunar 7-27) at the same time the banking panic broke out in N.Y.




Table 5 is reprinted from The N.Y. Times of October 14, illustrating the sharp rise in prices underway as contrasted with the lows of October 13. I’ve added the column on the right showing the month’s-end prices. Some issues had made their lows earlier in September, but others were at or near their lows on October 13. What’s clear is that prices began to rally from their depressed levels on lunar 7-27, coincident with the outbreak of the banking panic. This sequence parallels the 1987 experience, when U.S. bond prices began a sharp rally from their lows on lunar 7-27, coincident with the outbreak of the stock panic.

At this same time, Europe was aware of, and sharing in, the collapse in America. In the week leading up to October 13, the bank of England raised their discount rate twice, while Paris, Hamburg and Amsterdam each raised their rates once. Though debt and equity prices traded down sharply, there was no free-fall panic. London stocks and debt bottomed decisively on October 13 at the beginning of the trading day. The London Times of November 2, 1857 summarized the events of October and printed the table of prices labeled here as Table 6.



To that table is added the date of the month’s low for each security. Here is the commentary accompanying the table. "The range of Consols (government debt) has been unusually extensive, showing a difference of 4 percent between the highest and lowest prices, although at the conclusion (of the month) the market has returned to the precise position in which it stood at the commencement…In railway shares the fluctuations have also been violent, and the rebound, except in a few cases has not been equal to that of the funds."

The London Times offered this account of the trading in debt on October 13 in its October 14 edition. "The fluctuations in the funds today (Oct. 13) have again been most rapid and extensive. The market opened with a great weakness at a fall of nearly one and a quarter percent from the heavy prices of last evening. But there was subsequently a considerable reaction and a more healthful tone became apparent in all departments of business." Now, here’s the account of stock trading on October 13 from The New York Times of October 14. "The stock market this afternoon advanced from 1 to 3 percent, the conviction being general that the basis of business would be changed tomorrow and that a large amount of money held in abeyance since the panic first paralyzed confidence will be set free now that the worst is known…"

The cause of the market low in New York on October 13 is ascribed to the banking panic, yet London bottomed on the same day. The selling, motivated by fear, was pervasive on both side of the Atlantic leading up to October 13. That selling ceased and a vigorous rally commenced on the same day, continents apart, with neither market having access to any timely information from the other. Word of the N. Y. banking panic did not reach London until October 26, and was then reported in The Times the following day.

The sudden, international cessation of distress selling that is a hallmark of 20th century panics also occurred in the crisis of 1857, at a time when no timely communication existed. The international character of panics has been a stumbling block to those who subscribe to local, "fundamental" causes for these panics. Contrarily, a lunar-based model for panics would seem to require an international manifestation of the phenomenon. If the moon is affecting market participants, it should affect them the world over. All the panic examples cited here, from 1857 through 1997, have been international, yet the dearth of communication technology in 1857 provides a datum that cannot be explained as a serial reaction. The international character of panics is distinctively supportive of the lunar model.



Uses


Put simply, every market participant should have his calendar marked with the "dark days" of lunar 7-27 and 7-28. Even better, everyone should calculate the time of the eighth new moon and subtract 55 hours from that point. A time window of plus or minus twelve hours from that point is the lunar calendar model for an Autumn panic’s low point. There may not be another October stock panic for sixty years or longer. And the lunar model offers no clues as to which years will see a panic. Yet there can be no doubt, as the trillions of dollars lost during these panics makes plain, market intelligence that can pinpoint when an unfolding panic will climax is invaluable. In 1997, as worldwide markets became unglued in October, the lunar calendar model provided by 1987 and 1929 pointed to late Monday, October 27 as the ideal low point. The dramatic early Tuesday morning low of October 28 demonstrated the model’s effectiveness in real time.

Calendars are complex mechanisms. Calendar research must recognize the importance of both lunar and solar calendars. The annual lunar model for panics points to the 27th and 28th days of the lunar month as the dark days, yet that is only true in the autumn season, the 6th or 7th lunar month. Past studies that purport to find no lunar relationship in markets have treated all lunar phases alike, lumping spring and fall together as well as summer and winter. Likewise, specific seasonal analysis tends to ignore the concurrent lunar calendar. Those who dismiss that October may be a rough month for stocks cite that overall, it is not the worst month for stocks statistically, falling on average .5% since 1915. A proper approach to calendar research suggest that distinctions should be made among Octobers based on the lunar calendar. Here’s the lunar distinction. When there is no full moon between October 3 and 19 inclusive, the Dow has been up 1.5% in October since 1915. In those years with a full moon between those dates, the Dow’s average change is a loss of 1.9%. Seasonal analysis should recognize the lunar distinctions and vice versa. The annual lunar calendar makes those distinctions. When autumn panics are viewed though its prism, the results are remarkable.


过了中秋节再说...买月饼吃先. 今年月饼很早就上市,中元节还没过就上来抢钱.

origen

哈哈，原来满月真的会让人疯狂的，不过，我想提供一点解释，如果从很长很长的走势，然后切割一小段一小段，你会发现这一些小段小段主要都不是上，而是横向或下一点。。。

希望有一个很空闲对股市有兴趣的统计学家来调查。。。
anyway,这种另类说法也蛮有意思的。。

[ 本帖最后由 origen 于 29-7-2007 06:46 PM 编辑 ]

ee33

由于马股接下来的波动看来会比以往大，我不想搞到自己神经衰弱，因此也偏向于比较保守的投资策略。
我不指望我的股票开番，只求派息+资本增值有15%以上，从国家经济发展中分到一杯羹，取我能取的，我就心满意足了。
目前我的选择是继续持股，但是都是medium cap或big cap，大股东占有多数股份，dividend yield大概5%以上。
最主要还是自己睡得安心，睡得不安心的话，就好像dreamer所说的，卖到自己安心为止。

LK-Park

原帖由 ee33 于 29-7-2007 02:02 PM 发表
我说说七二七和二二八KLSE跌势有何不同。。。

1。二二八之前的热度比七二七之前为高。
2。二二八之前的散户参与度远比七二七之前为高。
3。二二八之前的热度由廉价小型股带动，七二七之前的热度由medium c ...

还有一个不同：
二二八当天的 buy rate 才 35%-45%
而七二七当天的 buy rate 有整 50-55%, 比平时还要多。

mjchua

原帖由 LK-Park 于 30-7-2007 12:50 AM 发表

还有一个不同：
二二八当天的 buy rate 才 35%-45%
而七二七当天的 buy rate 有整 50-55%, 比平时还要多。

那代表什麼... 基金買 ? 散戶買 ?
我想應該不是散戶吧 ?

LK-Park

今天有整 60% 的 buy rate

buy rate 高代表比较多交易以卖价成交
底就代表比较多交易以买价成交
就这样而已..

elvingan

就是说现在BUY RATE 51%,
代表 有51% 的买盘,
      49% 卖盘!!!
就是说现在买盘站上风...

KelvinLiew

一帖空洞無數據－無實質征戰－無引導軸線的內容－－我實在不明白加分精華的理由－－理財這裡沒落得如此頹廢－－

elvingan

收盘一定会小涨收场...

shuhjiunho

是要时候休息了。
这样才可以走更远的路。。。

8years

此帖讲述了跌势里的人性和看法，也包含了个人的应对跌势的看法，是有内容的。在投资路上随时会出现大跌，这帖可以当跌势里的指明灯。

8years

旧语连接（跌势做法）：http://chinese3.cari.com.my/myfo ... page%3D1&page=2

最近的熊市使我震动不少，市场传言四起，有人说股灾才要开始，有人说后市看涨。我也不知道后市会怎么样。不过如果用经济来分析，我依然认为马股今年还会再创新高。

这次的震动使我开窍不少，是一个很好的经验。对我来看，美国的经济只要没有问题（2季gdp好），我不会担心亚洲股市。我觉得这次的股灾是有计划的，也就是外资会在期货大赚。同样的如果要股市有力回，就一定要等到8月头（外资清完期货后）。和228一样的外资在期货上大赚。如果猜测正确，那么8月头外资才会买期货起（市场悲观时），然后才再推股市（之前卖了很多股票）。无独有偶，我也将在月头卖了pbbank(no more margin) 。margin的诅咒是命吗？？。。。。。。。。。。

结论：我不知道后市会如何，不过我选择和经济同步，和公司业绩同步，我还是会100%投资。经过了这次的震动，我又成长不少，我开始更了解长期投资能赚钱而投机不能赚钱的道理。我不会再用margin，也不想预测股市几时会上会下。因为只要我预测，我看到机会肯定会投机。接下来的日子，我会选择稳定投资。

再看回9年的投资经验，每一次的亏钱都因为margin，如果我没有用margin，我9年里应该没有亏过钱（年尾比年头多钱）。这次是很好的经验，我感谢这次的股灾，我的力量又增强了。我可能失败的几率又减少了 我又长大了。

大家也应该小心应战，现在不是可以有投机的心理。选择稳定投资将可以渡过这场风暴。

KelvinLiew

原帖由 elvingan 于 30-7-2007 02:50 PM 发表
收盘一定会小涨收场...

原因？？大勢走向？？亞太其他股市局勢如何？？精華樓留著吹水的嗎

糊涂

原帖由 KelvinLiew 于 30-7-2007 02:45 PM 发表
一帖空洞無數據－無實質征戰－無引導軸線的內容－－我實在不明白加分精華的理由－－理財這裡沒落得如此頹廢－－

哈哈，那是因为像你这样的强手没有发表一个既实质，又有引导轴线内容的文章来让我感动，不然你想要看到的理财论坛可能10年后亦不会出现。对糊涂来说，一篇能够让思索激荡的文章绝对值得慢慢的咀嚼与品尝，你就当糊涂有私心想把此文章留下来好了。

至于加分，此篇文章以宏观经济的角度来分析市场走势，分享可行的投资策略来应对727调整，这在佳礼理财论坛中仅见，糊涂感动之余加分似乎也无可厚非。