【专题讨论】转载香港曹仁超---投资者日记-熊二反彈進入浪B調整

四伯爽

（此篇文章版权归作者曹仁超）

英美同時選擇長痛
10月14日，周二。恒指上升520.72，收16832.88；成交816.6億元。10月期指升899點，收17079點。期指倒掛現象今天消失。

港銀擠提將成歷史
响各國政府公布為存款提供保證下，香港政府亦公布為所有本地註冊銀行嘅存款提供保障，以免香港存款流失；另一方面更可吸收東南亞地區資金來港，令香港呢個國際金融中心地位又邁進一大步！香港銀行資本充足比率一向好高，安全性極高，政府所作保證只係令大家安心，令類似東亞銀行（023）被擠提嘅事件成為歷史，以後應唔會再發生。政府提出保證後，政府日後將加強對銀行監管，以免真係要納稅人賠錢，亦有助本港銀行財政上更健全。

The Selling is Over？好多人希望上述係事實，可惜我老曹睇到嘅卻係投資者已進入搵錢困難期。1982至2007年長達二十五年資產升值期結束，簡單嘅「buy and hold」策略已唔管用。至於牛眼投資法，又非一般人可掌握（時機及對象要把握得十分準）。今年投資者損失資本30%至40%比比皆是，家吓危機仍處初階，因為禍因根深蒂固，並非政府三扒兩撥可搞掂。近月美國政府所做一切，一如九十年代日本政府，只係將危機拖長，減少眼前痛苦，而非解決問題。去年我老曹已一再警告次按危機但有幾多人能聽入耳？美國人嘅揮霍習慣短期內可以改變咩？西方政府早已處於財赤，救市資金只由「熱空氣」產生，擔心恐慌穩定後，痛苦先至嚟（此謂之痛定思痛也）。

响全球股市井噴下，滬深A股跌2.56%，收1934.62，中信證券、海通證券跌停，長江證券下跌9.9%。上述到底代表乜嘢？

政府入股銀行，同向銀行購買不良資產唔同。如入股銀行，政府日後可能賺錢（如日後銀行股股價上升）或虧損（如股價回落）；反之，購買不良資產卻係輸梗嘅生意！英國政府入股後，估計萊斯TSB將同HBOS成功合併，令英國政府佔合併後嘅萊斯銀行40％股權，成為最大股東（亦佔皇家蘇格蘭銀行60％股權）。呢類國有銀行存款有保障（因政府係最大股東），競爭力好大。歐盟共用1.1萬億歐羅（1.5萬億美元）去挽救歐洲地區性銀行。大摩估計，將令歐羅明年回落到1.25美元。

信貸危機來自資產（尤其股票）價格受到去槓桿化影響而回落，即使資產負債表良好嘅公司亦被拋售，因為唔少基金面對贖回潮，撲水要緊。

微軟創辦人蓋茨10月13日响哈佛商學院百年慶典上話，美國經濟正走向非常嚴重嘅衰退，美國失業率將升至9％以上。過去好多投資者抱住美國經濟永遠強勁嘅憧憬，唔現實咁認為市場可提供較高回報率，而從事高風險槓桿交易，依家紛紛蒙受重大損失。同為哈佛校友嘅通用電氣CEO伊梅爾特指出，金融系統穩定後，美國經濟仲會經歷兩季度負增長。次按貸款所引發嘅危機需要「某種形式嘅糾正」，企業唔會出現大規模瓦解，但經濟會出現下滑。

Dennis Gartman認為，呢次股市反彈維持唔會太耐，建議投資者利用反彈減持。

呢次金融海嘯對金磚四國影響亦幾大，中國股市已大跌，地產價格進入回落期，中國點樣擴大內需？印度零售業早已走下坡，加上過分依賴外資投入，最近印度盧比滙價亦受壓；俄羅斯受油價大跌影響，消費進入萎縮期；巴西係原料出口國，因此亦受影響。至於香港，星展銀行估計今年GDP只升3.8％（前估計4.4％），明年2.7％（前估計4.4％）。中國入口增長率減少，加上來自內地嘅自由行旅客消費增長率下降，香港股樓回落，亦令港人慳住荷包，都將影響明年香港GDP增長率。日本因日圓利率只有半厘，可對付衰退嘅武器冇乜，相信今年第三季已確認衰退。

雪茄伏認為，美國政府有能力阻止panic，卻無能力阻止衰退响明年出現。瑞銀嘅Larry Hatheway同Kenneth Leiw相信，美國及英國正進入深而長嘅衰退，並首次估計歐羅區明年進入溫和衰退；至於日本今年第三季已進入衰退【表】。

四伯爽

對症下藥vs藥石亂投
中國經濟學家樊鋼响國際高新技術成果交易會嘅資本市場高峰論壇上認為，即使有大危機，只要各國處理得好，仍可避免經濟大蕭條出現。

五百一十六年前哥倫布發現新大陸，從此南、北美洲叫做「新世界」，歐洲叫做「舊世界」。呢次由英國呢個「舊世界」教曉美國呢個「新世界」做嘢，透過政府注資銀行而非向銀行購買有毒資產，才能挽回投資者信心。因為銀行同業擔心對手嘅資本充足比率不足甚至可能破產，而唔肯將資金拆放出去。透過政府注資，同業知道對手唔會破產，自然恢復拆放．令信心危機解除。雷曼兄弟破產，受凍結資金高達3000億美元；AIG雖然冇破產，但管理嘅10000億美元資金亦幾麻煩；只有貝爾斯登被收購，令涉及嘅5000億美元管理資金冇被凍結。

由此可見，同業拆放最緊要係知道對手唔會破產。英國呢次係對症下藥，美國卻係藥石亂投。

不過，CDS市場仍在萎縮，上周五止總市值已下降到50萬億美元（一個月前係63萬億美元）。由於CDS唔係銀行存款，唔受政府保證，當政府宣布保障銀行存款後，反而引起更多機構拋售CDS改為存款，令CDS市價進一步下滑。換言之，政府注資銀行及為銀行存款提供擔保，只能恢復銀行同業拆放市場正常操作，但CDS危機持續，未來買樓再唔能夠獲次按協助，令美國樓價繼續下滑。

1992年8月19日日經平均指數曾由14194點反彈至1993年嘅24000點，其後喺14000至24000點牛皮，2000年終於14000點失守，下跌到2003年4月7600點，才結束日股熊市。後市展望，道指由7880點反彈，情況有如1992年8月日經平均指數，完成反彈後將進入一段十分長日子嘅上落市（日本長達七年），最終7880點失守，才完成整個美股熊市。2007年10月信貸泡沫爆破時，有兩大可能性：一、1929年10月嗰次因政府太遲入市干預，而令股市狂瀉到1932年，此乃華爾街大危機，由1933年起美國股市開始復甦。二、九十年代至2003年4月，日本响政府不斷支持下，令調整時間十分長，痛苦期共十三年。長痛、短痛任擇其一，英、美兩國同時選擇長痛，雖然令股市短期（道指7880點）獲支持反彈，但日後應進入漫長牛皮市。向本土銀行注資嘅行動雖阻止股市恐慌性拋售惡化落去，但唔代表問題解決。

上周五美股VIX升至76（正常情況只有30），代表股市早進入極度恐慌；加上上周五成交達一百一十六億股，大量分析員（包括我老曹）認為股市短期嘅底已搵到。納指由去年10月至上周五跌幅為前升幅（2003年4月起計）嘅76.4％，係Filonacci中表現最弱，代表由2007年11月開始嘅拋售潮已完成，進入Bargain Hunting期。上周五MSCI世界指數平均P/E只有十倍，為1982年以來最便宜；MSCI歐洲平均P/E更只有八倍，係1987年9月以來最低；反之，標普五百P/E仍係十六倍，未算便宜，估計完成上落市後，美股响未來日子仍再跌40％。CDS市場將進一步萎縮，CP（商業票據）市場亦萎縮，甚至信用狀（Letters of Credit）亦受影響，令未來國際貿易量萎縮；再加上日圓利差交易拆倉，未來世界將面對流動性萎縮！危機（Crisis）仍然存在，只係恐慌（Panic）被制止。近日股市雖然反彈，最終將因經濟陷入不景氣而引發另一次拋售潮，到時整個超級大熊市才告完成，時間十分長。

油價由150美元下滑到77美元，下跌50％，亦完成第一階段拋售，進入反彈期，估計最高可接近100美元才再引發另一次拋售，最低可見50美元，才完成「1、2、3」調整浪。

波羅的海指數今年5月至今跌咗77％，代表未來世界貨物嘅貿易量將進入萎縮期。

官僚取代自由市場制度
上周五美股低點只係一個中期底部，本周開始大量bargain hunters湧入市場，令本周全球股市大升。各國政府大量動用納稅人嘅錢入股銀行股，呢筆數日後點清還?!這將令明年全球經濟陷入衰退。

踏入二十一世紀，港人已進入Soft Depression期（輕輕的憂鬱）。港人曾面對1997年下半年樓市下跌、2000年科網股泡沫爆破，2007年8月至今又嚟一個次按危機，今年起高消費、高槓桿比率時代結束；甚至係西方領導嘅時代結束，東方正在冒起！未來新世界秩序正在形成！加強監管、控制、干預已成為天公地道嘅事，官僚漸漸取代自由市場制度；喺高官領導下，事情似乎愈搞愈糟。因泡沫由形成到爆破有一定軌迹可尋，過去高官製造次按泡沫，卻唔容許泡沫爆破後遺症出現，可以咩？我地正面對Centralized Manipulation所產生嘅悲劇後果。

T. Boone Pickens响1997年6月離開石油事業，開始自己嘅事業生涯，以朋友嘅3700萬美元資金開始創業，到1998年5月已失去2400萬美元，1999年1月只剩番270萬美元；但到2000年卻升值到25200萬美元，其後一帆風順！佢投資嘅天然氣，不但美國電力公司用作發電，亦有巴士公司用作能源。依家佢改為大量投資水項目，估計未來亦可成功。T. Boone Pickens成功之處係當佢已失去投入本金95%時仍肯捱落去！好多時最黑暗時刻就係光明嘅開始，每一個成功者背後都有一萬個失敗者，成功與失敗往往只差一線，就係喺最困難日子裏你係咪願意繼續捱落去！

四伯爽

（此篇文章版权归作者曹仁超）

現在估底實太早
10月15日，周三。恒生指數跌834.58，收15998.3，成交522億元。10月期指跌1139點，收15940點。美國三藩市聯儲銀行主席葉倫認為，美國已陷入衰退。過去兩天，二十三個已發展國家股市反彈12％後，似乎已完成反彈。必和必拓回落11％，因銅價下跌；Anglo American亦回落12％，因鉛、錫及鎳跌價；力拓回落6.1％；本港恒鼎實業（1393）跌18.18％；兗州煤業（1171）跌10.02％。

注資不能改變股市走勢

CRB 指數（代表十九種原材料）跌幅已達39％，可以媲美2000至01年（跌幅37％）或1997／98年（跌幅28％）。家吓銅價仍較2001年低潮時高出三倍；油價同1998年低位10.35美元距離仲好遠。根據哈佛大學經濟學家Martin Feldstein（佢同時係美國商業周期成員）研究，通常商品價格見底後一年經濟先復甦。換言之，即使CRB指數最近已見底，我地最少仍面對一年衰退期。高盛證券估計，明年鉛價將回落17％及銅價回落12％。UBS估計，鎳價仲有32％及白金50％下跌空間。摩根士丹利估計，明年鉛價將回落20％及鈀金45％。如佢地嘅預測準確，即距離衰退結束期仲遠。股市通常响衰退結束前三至六個月先見底，依家估底係咪太早?!

聯儲局宣布，連同G7將採取一切有需要手段去水浸金融市場。上述行為可能引發股市短期反彈，可唔可以改變股市長期大方向？答案係唔可以。

花旗調低中國境內銀行純利估計，平均達20%至26％，明年再減少22%至28％。內地銀行股前景繼續睇跌，令喺本港上市內地銀行股嘅股價今天跌幅好大。

德國經濟信心指數急跌，令思捷環球（330）下跌10.6％。

特首今天認為，呢次全球信貸壓碎，較1997年亞洲金融風暴嚴重，香港已進入不穩定期，並已擔保全港存款安全。過去十二個月全球股市冇咗7萬億美元市值，香港經濟係海島式經濟，無法避免唔受外面因素影響，何況過去港股受流動資金推動而一度升上32000點；去年所產生嘅財富效應及今年財富萎縮，令香港成為世界經濟中最槓桿化嘅地區之一。面對呢種局勢，特區政府可做嘅事好有限，市民只有自求多福。擔心全球經濟陷入衰退，令反彈市好短命，各國政府只係成功制止恐慌，卻未有解決危機。

美國金融危機已波及中國樓市，海外投資機構急於出貨，令滬深三百指數回落1.05％，收1914.36。

滬深三百指數又再失守2000點，中石化下跌6.48％、國壽下跌4.844％及金牛能源跌停板；西山煤電、平煤及神火等跌幅亦好大；新農開發跌停板，冠農、北大荒及民和跌幅超過7％；後市繼續向下沉。

Iowa Electronic Markets（IEM）家吓盤口係11月如奧巴馬勝出，85元賠100元；如麥凱恩勝出，16元賠100元。睇嚟各位又要準備為奧巴馬震驚。如奧巴馬勝出，美國黑人以為自己大哂，咁都幾煩。如奧巴馬失敗，美國黑人又肯定美國白人歧視佢地！換言之，無論下個月大選結果係點，美國經濟都面對另一場震驚。

聯儲局計劃購買通用電氣等短期債券，支持家吓市值只有1.6萬億美元CP市場，只係咁樣會令其他公司更加唔易發商業票據。

有人形容依家美國經濟好似剛急救成功嘅病人，雖然已離開深切治療室，但各位唔好希望佢明天可以參加跑步。

紐約大學Nouriel Roubini教授認為，美國將進入四十年內最嚴重一次衰退，估計長達十八至二十四個月，失業率高達9％；未來住宅樓價再下跌15％；次按危機帶嚟約3萬億美元虧損（10月7日IMF估計1.4萬億美元），家吓已公布嘅虧損只有6370億美元。

雷曼兄弟三千五百多名活躍客戶持有450億美元證券，因雷曼兄弟破產，佢地無法操作自己嘅戶口，喺最近一個月跌市中損失慘重，如因此資不抵債，仍需補孖展。佢地可能較雷曼迷你債券苦主更苦，因雷曼兄弟破產而無法止蝕先會變成負資產。

花旗估計，歐羅兌日圓將回落13％，年底見120日圓兌1歐羅或1.28美元兌1歐羅。

歐洲央行主席希望重返布列頓森林時代（金本位制），以便建立金融系統紀律及固定滙率。世界經濟似乎回到過去？

大部分企業純利負增長
上周道指回落20％，係1914年12月以嚟最差一星期，理由係銀行同業拆放市場出現問題。本周各國政府注資後，銀行同業拆放市場恢復正常，但拆息仍高企（美元拆息仍高出聯邦基金利率）。財經歷史學家John Steele Gordon翻查由1792年美國政府第一次挽救銀行至今，發現每隔二十年便有一次金融危機，證明銀行及信貸市場係唔可以實行自由市場經濟；呢次金融危機成因係金融系統引入大量創新產品。上一次係1989年S&L及垃圾債券危機，由於規模唔大，好快便撲熄咗；接住係1998年長期資金管理公司危機（或俄羅斯債券危機）；呢次係次按危機。相信危機最終亦會被撲熄，自由民主政治及自由市場經濟長存。

展望未來，英美樓價繼續下跌，以及銀行繼續需尋找新資金注入以提升穩健性。62萬億美元市值嘅CDO市場，已減少至上周五嘅50萬億美元，估計未來仲會繼續減少落去。最終經濟可復甦，問題只係唔知邊一天開始。與1989年六四事件唔同，當年滿街鮮血（政治方面）係入市時機；今年反而係市場好麻煩（Trouble in the market）才令滿街鮮血，不可一概而論。恒生指數由去年10月高峰至今，已大跌超過50％（其中一半由9及10月完成）。1974年嘅教訓係遲入市好過早入市。

雪茄伏認為，政府一連串措施只能穩定金融系統，但無法阻止衰退出現；美國樓價仍在回落，即銀行界虧損仍在擴大。佢唔認為大量注資可引發通脹（喺衰退期通脹唔會出現），反而應擔心我地幾時先可以擺脫衰退。

黑石集團CEO施瓦茨曼認為，銀行恢復健康需時（呢間公司去年6月以31美元上市，最近市價11.54美元），銀行股冇吸引力。

Jeremy Grantham係GMO主席，佢認為家吓入市仍太早，因為美股仲未算便宜。

Caroline Baum認為，八十年代至今，央行透過放鬆銀根政策去對付泡沫爆破；最後一次係納指由2000年3月至2002年10月回落78％，減息至2003年6月 1厘後亦回升。呢次樓價回落一樣係採用減息方法，但日本銀行1990年至今已證明甚至減至零利率，仍無法令日本樓價上升，英美會否例外？

好多人近日誇口自己一早預計次按危機出現，而忘記太早睇淡係死罪。2006年年初已睇淡，便錯過去年大牛市帶嚟嘅風光；最叻嘅人喺去年10月先睇淡！同樣理由，太早睇好亦係死罪。我老曹曾喺1974年7月開始睇好，但恒生指數喺1974年12月先見底，太早睇好代價係冇咗當年我老曹80％本金。因此恒指見底回升由得佢，直到第二個底高出第一個底為止（所謂Bottom Up）；恒指見頂亦由得佢，直到第二個頂無法高出第一個頂為止（便叫Top Down）。唔好忘記旺市莫估頂及淡市莫估底嘅格言。

我老曹認為，分析員對明年企業純利展望仍然太樂觀。我老曹估計，明年企業純利較今年大部分係負增長，擔心未來恒指P/E將回落到八倍以下，即唔少股價仲有好大下跌空間。將銀行國有化可阻止存款戶恐慌，但不能阻止英美樓價繼續下沉，搞到D銀行冇息派（呢個係政府注資令銀行股價下跌理由）。

四伯爽

歷史證明政府愈介入經濟，經濟表現會愈差，例如蘇聯1970年計劃經濟；中國1949至78年三十年共產經濟。因為官僚唔按市場規律辦事而浪費珍貴資源，所以先有1978年中國改革開放政策及九十年代蘇聯解體。家吓西方國家官員大量介入金融業，後果會係點？會唔會出現crony capitalism（有權勢嘅資本主義）。不過，錢喺邊度嚟？一、稅收；二、借番嚟。政府用作收購不良資產及注資銀行嘅資金嚟自借貸市場，即資源由自由市場流向有權勢嘅資本家（官員）手中，最終導致資源錯配而壓抑經濟繁榮。有人認為市場失效，官員先介入；事實剛好相反，係官員介入令市場失效。例如「兩房」過去不按經濟規律辦事，2003年6月聯儲局減息至1厘，維持達一年之久，都係官僚令自由市場失效嘅說明，今年入市挽救銀行、情況同九十年代日本相似；美國同歐洲正步日本後塵進入crony capitalism！經過漫長一年跌市後，投資者相信高官先可以重新穩定經濟，雖然真實情況唔係咁；佢地亦相信經濟去槓桿化後，唔會帶嚟更多眼淚；佢地甚至認為，最惡劣日子已過去──例如上周五股市已見底！觀察過日本九十年代表現後，知道上述信念好脆弱。不過，外面係咁冰凍，有時亦只有捐入愛斯基摩人用雪塊砌出嚟嘅小冰屋避寒，雖然明知唔係長久居所。一年前冇人知道天氣可以變得咁嚴寒，令大部分人未有準備寒衣過冬，加上唔少投資者不但失去裇衫，連鞋、襪甚至底褲都冇埋，搞到喺嚴寒中赤裸裸；當見到禾桿草時亦死抓住唔放。

投資者今天睇睇自己嘅投資組合只見一片紅，唔少已冇咗40％市值；面對最近幾天股市反彈曾好高興，好似喺北極見到一點光咁，可惜我地見到嘅可能只係北極光而唔係陽光。

投資唔好靠預測
第一個底由拋空者平倉造成（例如2002年10月美股），日後唔再低過呢個底才確認牛市出現（例如2003年4月）；反之，未來日子如創新低，便代表熊市繼續，反彈只係另一隻熊腳。到底上周五係底定係熊腳？等股市自己話畀大家知。如你一味想摸底，咁又點持盈保泰？我老曹冇水晶球，所以亦唔知幾時見底；只知一浪低於一浪要出貨（Top Down），一浪高於一浪才入貨（Bottom Up）。

預測唔係可靠嘅投資工具（如你預測，遲早出錯），只有嚴守紀律，唔摸頂及唔估底；只有當頭起時入貨，當頭跌時出貨，先係致勝方法。

政府注資銀行只解決Solvency問題，至於Recapitalization問題，就有排先搞得掂。除CDO市場在溶解中，巨大嘅衍生工具市場亦喺度縮細緊，家吓已預告去槓桿化日子完成，早唔早D呀！

Mr.Business

老曹介绍的Dow Theory Letters。

http://ww2.dowtheoryletters.com/

Mr.Business

原来Dow Theory Letters是要钱的。。。

放上其它不用钱的文章。。。

The following piece is for serious market students. What I wrote below is information that you will rarely see anywhere else. I hope it will dispel some of the misconceptions and utter nonsense  that has circulated about Dow Theory. Read on.

DOW'S THEORY: From the very beginning (July 1958) I called my report Dow Theory Letters, and there are obvious reasons for that. The reasons are (1) I truly believe in the basic tenets of Dow Theory, and (2) I wanted to teach Dow Theory and I wanted to insure that the Dow Theory tenets, rules and observations were passed on to future generations.

Before I start this section let me say that there are hundreds of predictive and trend-following techniques that are now used (some very worthwhile, others less so) by market students. I follow dozens of these techniques and devices, but none of them will ever replace or negate the basic tenets of Dow Theory.

I've been writing these reports for 41 years and never a month goes by that someone doesn't announce that the Dow Theory is antiquated and that it no longer works. The detractors, almost to a man, do not know their subject and have, in almost all cases, never studied Dow Theory. The Dow Theory (actually it is a set of observations) has basically to do with buying great values and selling those values when they become overpriced.

Value is the operative word in Dow Theory. All other Dow Theory considerations are secondary to the value thesis. Therefore, price action, support lines, resistance, confirmations, divergence --- all are of much less importance than value considerations, although critics of the Theory seem totally unaware of that fact.

I've spent two-thirds of my life studying and writing about the markets. And I'd say that without a shadow of a doubt the material which has served me best are the books and papers written by the great Dow Theorists -- Charles H. Dow, William P. Hamilton, Robert Rhea and E. George Schaefer.

First, let's talk about Charles Dow, a man who, by any reckoning, must be considered a brilliant market observer and theorist. Dow started his career as an investigative reporter, specializing in business and finance. In 1885 (and few people are aware of this), Dow became a member of the New York Stock Exchange, and this provided him with an intimate knowledge of how the market works. In 1889 Dow began publishing a little newspaper which he called The Wall Street Journal. Between 1899 and 1902 Dow wrote a series of editorials for his Journal, editorials that many consider among the finest ever to come out of Wall Street. Written almost 100 years ago, these editorials are as pertinent and valuable today as they were the day they were written.

Dow was a very modest man, and although his admirers begged him to write a book explaining his theories, Dow stubbornly refused. However, Dow's good friend, S.A. Nelson, published 15 of Dow's Wall Street Journal editorials in a little volume entitled, "The ABC of Stock Speculation." A footnote at the bottom of each chapter refers to the editorial as "Dow's Theory." But Dow himself never once used the term.

Following Dow's death, two other men took over editorship of the Journal for brief periods. They were followed by William P. Hamilton, who was the fourth editor of the WSJ. Hamilton wrote a brilliant series of 252 editorials. These pieces appeared in the Journal between 1903 and 1929, and in Barron's (the Journal's sister publication) during 1922 to 1929. As time passed, Hamilton's writing attracted a wide and devoted following. In 1926 Hamilton wrote his landmark book entitled, "The Stock Market Barometer," in which he presented his own version of Dow Theory.

Hamilton had been Dow's understudy at the Journal, and in his book he included much of Dow's market observations and philosophy. But Hamilton also presented his own views on Dow Theory, and it was Hamilton who first defined the confirmation principle of the Averages. Hamilton died in 1930 soon after writing his most famous editorial, "The Turn of the Tide" (written on October 25, 1929). This fateful forecast served as the obituary for the amazing and hugely speculative 1921-'29 bull market.

The next great writer in the Dow Theory chain was Robert Rhea. Rhea was a devoted student of Hamilton's, and Rhea adhered closely to Hamilton's version of Dow Theory. Over a period of many years, Rhea codified and refined Dow Theory, always deferring to Hamilton in his explanations. I've studied every work and sentence that Rhea ever wrote, and in my opinion, Rhea was the greatest market trader of his time.

Rhea possessed a marvelous, instinctive gift for reading the Averages. He had an uncanny ability to identify and trade on the secondary as well as the primary trend of the market. Rhea was bed-ridden with TB, and he relied on his remarkable trading ability to support himself and pay his costly medical bills.

On November 12, 1932, Rhea started a stock market service which he titled, "Dow Theory Comment." The service was successful from the start. Rhea called the exact bottom of the bear market on July 8, 1932, a feat which I consider one of the most remarkable in the history of stock market analyses. Rhea's early letters were written during the depths of the greatest depression in American history, and you can imagine the skepticism with which his almost shocking bullish reports were greeted. Rhea also called the turn (to the downside) in the bear market of 1937, and this feat, even more than his 1932 bull market call, made Rhea a household name on Wall Street.

Sadly, Rhea's disease took its toll. Only seven years after he started his advisory service, Rhea died (1939). Following Rhea's death, the Dow Theory lay dormant for the many years during WWII and afterwards.

The next major figure in Dow Theory was E. George Schaefer of Indianapolis. Schaefer started his career as a stock broker with Goodbody & Co. He spent many years studying the writing of the great Dow Theorists who preceded him. But Schaefer concentrated his studies on the brilliant and seminal writings of Charles Dow. Schaefer was a firm believer in VALUES. One of Schaefer's favorite quotes from Dow was, "An investor who will study values and market conditions, and then exercise enough patience for six men will likely make money in stocks."

Another Dow quote used by Schaefer states, "It is always safer to assume that values determine prices in the long run. Values have nothing to do with current fluctuations. A worthless stock can go up 5 points just as easily as the best, but as a result of continuous fluctuations the good stock will gradually work up to its investment value."

Schaefer believed that both Hamilton and Rhea placed too much emphasis on the pattern of the Averages and not enough emphasis on the principle of buying great values and holding those values throughout the life of a bull market. Schaefer wrote, "It has always been of interest to me that Hamilton and Rhea . . . both steered away from Dow's thinking in many respects. Hamilton was very reluctant to give Dow the full credit he deserved. And Rhea, in turn, disregarded the works of Dow almost entirely and specialized in trying to improve the Hamilton version of Dow Theory."

In 1948 Schaefer started his own advisory service which he called, "Schaefer's Dow Theory Trader." Schaefer's timing was fortunate but more probably brilliant. On June 13, 1949, with the Dow at a multi-year low of 161.60, one of history's great bull markets began. Exactly five days from that low, on June 18, 1949, Schaefer wrote what I consider an advisory masterpiece (I still have that report). In that piece Schaefer stated his reasons for believing that a great buying area was at hand and that a major bull market had begun.

In that June 18, 1949 report Schaefer wrote, "The philosophy of Charles Dow always gave first consideration to values, then to economic conditions and third to the action of both the Industrial and Rail Averages. When the low point of a bear market is reached, values will be the first indication of a change in trend. In the past 17 years only three opportunities have presented themselves to buy stocks at great values. Now the fourth opportunity is making its appearance."

Schaefer's June '49 forecast turned out to be uncannily accurate. In June the Dow turned up from its 161.60 low, and a great bull market began. Schaefer stayed with the bull market through thick and thin until 1966. On February 9, 1966, 17 years later, the Dow topped out at a value of 995.15. Those who followed Schaefer's Dow Theory interpretations and investment procedures (i.e., those who held their stocks throughout the bull market as Schaefer repeatedly advised) made fortunes.

One of the reasons Schaefer started his advisory service was to present what he terms his "New Dow Theory," a set of principles which he insisted "could be applied profitably to present-day markets." Schaefer wrote in 1960, "A study of the Averages themselves can be highly rewarding. But in my opinion, a forecast based on past movements of the Averages cannot be conclusive. Predictions of events to come are more reliable if they can be reinforced by analysis of other technical and more conclusive factors."

What were the "other factors" which Schaefer referred to? Some of them were values (and again I  emphasize values), the 200-day moving average of the Dow, the short interest ratio, the advances and declines, Dow's 50% Principle, market sentiment, market phases, and the yield cycle. Remember, prior to Schaefer, orthodox Dow Theorists tended to avoid all "extraneous" items other than the pattern of the Averages and volume, claiming that other items only interfered with pure, basic, Dow Theory studies. Schaefer disagreed vehemently.

Schaefer possessed great market intuition, and he used his market instincts plus his new tools to ride the great 1949-'66 bull market all the way from the bottom in 1949 to the top in 1966. Through reactions, corrections, panics and dips, Schaefer insisted that his subscribers hold their shares and buy more during all periods of weakness.

That may sound easy, but believe me it is not. The number of people who hold stocks from the beginning to the end of a bull market can probably be counted in the hundreds. In early-1966, Schaefer turned bearish on the market (based on third phase considerations and overvaluation of stocks), and he advised his followers to "sell out." Schaefer remained bearish until the time of his tragic and untimely death (suicide) in 1974.

Although Hamilton and Rhea took careful note of the secondary reactions in bull and bear markets, Schaefer advised his subscribers to ignore these "temporary reactions," and to remain invested in harmony with the primary trend of the market. In his historic report of June 18, 1949, Schaefer wrote, "Once stocks are purchased, both the minor and secondary movements in the market should be completely disregarded. A new period of prosperity will follow, once the present recession has run its full course."  We now know how prophetic those words were (words which were written during a time of extreme fear and gloom) .

Later Schaefer wrote, "So far as I can ascertain from his original writings, Dow had an open mind, and there was a great deal of flexibility in his thinking regarding the price movements."

The following is extremely important, and subscribers should take careful note of this: Schaefer believed that mass emotions were changing the character of the stock market. He realized that Wall Street was gathering a much larger following year after year, and that the American public was becoming much more involved with investments (today, of course, Wall Street has gone both electronic and global). This relatively new phenomenon of mass emotions, Schaefer believed, had to be taken into consideration as far as classic Dow Theory was concerned.

Wrote Schaefer, "My new Dow Theory involves a broad, balanced manner of thinking about the market and your own emotions. It is a far cry from the narrow 'system' that places a complete reliance upon what the Averages do. Yes, we who study the new Dow Theory watch the Averages. But along with any such observations we realize and understand that the market is composed of people of all types, and that all people are born emotional."

So what was the result of Schaefer's emphasis on the emotions of an enormous and growing investment public? It was this -- Schaefer allowed for secondary reactions to far overshoot the restrictions which were laid out by orthodox Dow Theory. Years earlier Rhea had written that in a bull market, secondary reactions tend to retrace one-third to two-thirds of the preceding uncorrected primary advance while tending to last three weeks to three months.

Schaefer dismissed Rhea's "out-dated concepts." Schaefer believed that mass psychology and the intense emotions of the public could take the Averages well beyond the "normal bounds" outlined by Hamilton and Rhea. Wrote Schaefer, "Today our new Dow Theory allows the crowd to get as emotional in its selling or buying as it will -- with no restrictions whatever on the duration or extent of the secondary or intermediate trend. In primary bull markets, when things get scary, we simply wait for the fearful to sell out, and then we assume that the main primary trend will resume as expected. In primary bear markets, just the opposite is true."

This "new Dow Theory" thinking proved extremely valuable in late-1957 when a severe secondary reaction hit Wall Street. When the Averages broke through their preceding secondary lows, many orthodox Dow Theorists, who relied almost totally (as most do today) on the pattern of the Averages, proclaimed that a bear market had started. These bears ignored such critical factors as the phases, length of the bull market, values, Dow yield, etc.

Schaefer differed totally (as I did in 1957) with the prevailing Wall Street opinion. Both of us insisted that the bull market had not yet experienced a classic speculative third phase and that the late-1957 cave-in was not a bear market but a severe secondary reaction. We held that the reaction had been intensified by extraordinary public fear, fear that was triggered by the violent breakdown in the Averages.

In fact, I was so certain during 1957-'58 that we were witnessing a bull market correction rather than a primary bear market that I started Dow Theory Letters at that time. Furthermore, in December 1958, I wrote my first article for Barron's (entitled "Dow Theory Revisited"). That Barron's article drew a tremendous response and was instrumental in putting me in business (in the years that followed I wrote about 30 additional articles for Barron's).

Basic to both Schaefer's and my thinking during 1957-'58 was the fact that we had not yet experienced a bull market third speculative phase. Also, during the drastic 1957 decline the 50% Principle remained bullish.

Let me explain because this is important. The Dow had risen from a 1953 low of 255.49 to a record high in 1956 of 521.05. The halfway or 50% level of that three-year rise was 388.27. On the vicious 1957 decline the Dow collapsed to a low of 419.79, a level which was well above the 388.27 or the 50% level of its preceding rise. The fact that on the decline the Dow could retain better than half the gains of the 1953-'56 rise was a powerful bull argument, particularly since this phenomenon occurred in the face of such universally black pessimism (by the way, I have never, before or since, seen gloom to match that which existed during the 1957-'58 recession and market collapse).

Back to George Schaefer. Schaefer used the 200-day moving average of the Dow to advantage in his work. But he warned "that as with other technical studies, the 200-day moving average should never be considered alone. My experience has been that interpretations under the 200-day moving average rule must always be correlated with other studies."

The experience during the 1949-'66 bull market served me well. The 200-day MA turned down in 1953 (during a secondary correction), and it turned down again in 1956 (during another secondary). Neither of these downturns in the MA indicated that the primary trend of the market had turned bearish, and each of the downturns in the MA was followed by a major rise as the bull market reasserted itself. Thus, those who say that the direction of the 200-day MA identifies the direction of the primary trend would do well to study history. But Schaefer noted, "the 200-day MA should never be used alone and to do so can cause expensive mistakes."

I wrote the foregoing because I wanted to give subscribers an accurate (even though brief) view of Dow Theory and its evolution over the past 90 years. Few, very few, market practitioners have ever made a serious study of Dow's Theory, although many analysts mouth meaningless Dow Theory platitudes. I know of only a handful of people who have ever read the works of Dow, Rhea, Hamilton or Schaefer. Yet, the Dow Theory remains the basis of all technical analysis. The Theory also constitutes the basis for much intelligent and profitable investing. I have shown how the Theory has evolved through the years. I have also attempted to show how the Theory has been improved with each Dow Theorist and how each practitioner has worked with the Theory and applied it to the particular markets of his time.

I've tried to carry on the work of Dow, Hamilton, Rhea and Schaefer. I believe, however, that the stock market is far more difficult today than ever before, mainly because so many analysts, professionals, money managers, arbitrageurs, speculators and serious individuals are involved, and competing for profits (and increasingly, for short term and even intra-day profits). Furthermore, trading has been speeded up and broadened tremendously through the use of computers and the Internet. Finally, the arrival on the scene of "derivatives," options, futures, puts, calls, etc., makes the market game bigger, faster, more manipulative, more hazardous -- and far more deceptive than ever before.

In the end, however, the "hidden ingredient" for market success is the practitioner's own instincts or intuition. Market analysis, as some many have observed, is an art, not a science.

I guess every Dow Theorist (and every market practitioner) has added or latched on to a few devices which he feels will help him with his market studies. I've developed my Primary Trend Index. This composite Index has been a huge help to me in my own trading. As a matter of fact, many of my own subscribers base their market position strictly on the trend of the PTI.

http://ww2.dowtheoryletters.com/ ... the_dow_theory.html

Mr.Business

Dow Theory Letters的文章。。。

THE FOUR GREATEST CALLS IN STOCK MARKET HISTORY –

Bull market tops tend to be long and drawn out with first one group, then the next group fading away.


Bear market bottoms, on the other hand, tend to be much more decisive. Buy a cross-section of stocks at or near a bear market bottom, and most probably all your selections will move higher as a unit. In other words, it’s much more satisfactory to buy a selection of stocks off a bear market bottom than it is to sell a portfolio of stocks off a bull market top.

I’m presenting four most interesting calls of major, and I mean MAJOR, bear market bottoms. In each case the situation was frightening, stocks had declined for years, investors had lost fortunes and Wall Street was in a state of fear and despair.

Yet, amid the pain and destruction, the stock market was giving off signals that the worst was over, and that a new primary bull market was about to be born.

I blushingly include my own late-1974 call, a turn-of-the-tide call because I truly believe that it truly was a great call. At any rate, you be the judge. Like the other three “new bull market” calls, my 1974 call was a “cry in the wilderness.” As I remember, literally nobody else was bullish in late-1974.

I hope that these four reports, never before seen together, will serve as valuable studies for future investors and students of the stock market. I also hope that these four reports will serve to convince investors that the Dow Theory is the most basic and valuable of all market studies.


First came the Dow Theory – then came everything else.

Richard Russell

July 27, 2003.

http://ww2.dowtheoryletters.com/ ... TEST+CALLS?OpenPage


Robert Rhea was a pioneering figure in the history of Dow Theory. Rhea was a master of “reading” the stock averages along with volume implications. Rhea started his great investment service in 1932. He modestly called his service, “Dow Theory Comment.” Rhea’s Dow Theory “voyage” ended with his death in 1939.

Rhea had a private following of investors, and this group kept in contact with Rhea through a single stockbroker. Rhea writes, “On July 21 when the Industrials closed at 46.50 and the Rails at 16.76, I asked my broker to tell my friends trading in various offices that I thought the Dow Theory implied heavy buying for the first time in over three years. On July 26, 1932, the opinion below was sent to perhaps fifty correspondents.”

Russell Comment - I include below the opinion that Robert Rhea sent to his correspondents on July 26, 1932. This was sent just a few weeks after the final bottom of the worst bear market in US history. I consider it one of the greatest calls in stock market history.

Robert Rhea Calls the Turn

The declines of both Rail and Industrial averages between early March and midsummer were without precedent. The thirty-five year record of the averages shows a fairly uniform recovery after every major primary action, and such recoveries average around 50% of the ground lost on the decline; are seldom less than a third and more than two thirds. Such recovery periods tend to run to about 40 days, but are sometimes only three weeks – and occasionally three months.

The time element is in favor of a normal reaction at this time – because the slide off was normal (the normal time interval of major declines being about 100 days).

The market gave the unusual picture of hovering near the lows for more than seven weeks, and might be said to have made a “line” during the latter weeks of that period.

Because of all these things, and because the volume tended to diminish on recessions and increase on rallies during the ten days preceding July 21, almost any one trading on the Dow Theory would have bought stocks on July 19th. Those who did not, had a clean cut signal again on the 21st. Since that date the implications of the averages have been uniformly bullish, and it is reasonable to expect that a normal secondary will be completed, even though the primary trend may not have changed to “bull”. So much for the speculative viewpoint.

However, the investor asks, “Have we seen the lows for the bear market?” According to strict construction of Dow Theory, we cannot yet tell.

Surely we have many things which might lead us to believe this to be true – we have surely had a considerable period of accumulation, but these periods frequently preface secondary reactions, or occur at some intermediate point in a secondary. Should this secondary reach normal limits with respect to recovery and duration, and a decline of some weeks follow, and this decline did not break the bear market lows, after which a recovery set in which carried above the high point of the secondary now in the making, it would seem reasonable to suppose that the lows had been passed. And should the secondary now forming develop a sideways drag beneath normal expected recovery points, making a clearly defined “line”, and should such line be broken topside with some healthy advances, it

would be a splendid buying signal.

Robert Rhea
July 25, 1932

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Russell Comment – I knew Justin Barbour back in the 1960s. He was a most unusual fellow, and an avid stock market student. He was also a firm believer in the Dow Theory. The remarkable piece below was written three months after the extreme low for the market (the low was struck in April 1942).

The psychology when this was written was black-gloomy, and indeed at the time it seemed a very real possibility that the Allies would lose the War. The furthest thing in anyone’s mind was that in mid-1942 a vicious bear market was ending and a new bull market was beginning. But Justin Barbour got it right -- he got it very right.

From mid-1942 to the bull market peak in 1946 the market put in one of the greatest breadth performances in history. Almost every stock that was tradable moved up from the depths of 1942.

Read this “long-lost” document carefully, because I consider it one of the greatest market calls in Wall Street history.

Reproduced from the Chicago Journal of Commerce Issue of July 6, 1942

STOCK MARKET IMPLICATIONS
Many Characteristics of the First Phase of a Bull
Market Are Present at This Time

By Justin F. Barbour

The characteristics of the market are those of the beginning of a change in major trend. These characteristics are the market’s seeming immunity to the news; the extreme low volume of trading for many months; and the in-gear advance that is developing in the averages. These are significant symptoms because they are occurring after a bear market has run a very long time and after two periods of marked divergence in the movements of the averages. In addition to expecting a bull market to set in after many months of constant unfavorable news and decline, one should expect a bull market to develop in the war period because it is the history of war periods here and abroad.

The movements of the market are susceptible to wide analysis. In addition to extent and duration, movements can be judged by their characteristics and phases. The initial phase of a major move - bull or bear – develops at an extreme and invariably at a time when the prevailing news is in decided conflict to the new move.

The second phase coincides with the recognition of the new move and the visibility of developments justifying it. The confirmation of the change in major trend usually marks the division between the first and second phases. The third phase is the period of universal recognition of both the major trend and the conditions responsible for it. It is usually a period of increasing volume and the time when one feels confident in as well as the desire to participate in and profit from the established trend.

It is easy to apply these phases to the markets of the past. The first phase of the bear market was present in the Fall of 1939 when business, earnings and dividends were increasing because of the war in Europe. At the time it was hard to understand why the averages failed to continue their advance in the face of such economic conditions. The second phase came with the invasion of the low countries and the panic decline in mid-May, 1940.

The second phase continued until the surprise attack on us at Pearl Harbor brought us both into the war and the beginning of a complete war economy. It was at this point that the third and final phase of the bear market set in, the period in which so many developments – adversity, priorities, price ceilings, rationing and taxation – made it so easy to justify the sale of securities.

In the transitory period, there may be an overlapping of the third or final phase of one major movement and the first phase of the next major move. While temporarily there may be a question as to the point at which the third phase ends and the first phase begins, in the current instance it can be said that the bear market has been in its third and final phase a long time and that the characteristics of the first phase of a bull market are present.



Conditions of Change

These characteristics as before mentioned are: (1) an extreme point – the lowest in many years; (2) the seeming immunity of the market to the prevailing news; (3) the extreme low volume of trading; and (4) the in-gear advance that is developing in the averages.

On April 28 the industrial average was at its lowest point in seven years; the rail average close to the low of two years and in the low area of nine years. One group, the utilities, was at their lowest point of record. An extreme, out of which the first phase develops was and is present.

For at least two weeks the market has appeared to be immune to very depressing news. Except for the initial day of decline the averages have moved sidewise and advanced in the face of a major military defeat. Neither dividend reductions nor the proposed tax bill appear to depress stocks now. Demand prevails where the impulse is to sell.

Volume is very low and is characteristic of completed moves. The tendency of volume is to expand as moves gain momentum and become obvious, and to contract when they have exhausted themselves. Peak volume since the bear market set in, as measured by a five weeks average, was 1,392,000 shares daily, reached in the panic decline of May 1940. This peak was closely approached last December as a result of the combination of selling generated by the Jap attack on Pearl Harbor and year end tax selling.

The lowest average volume in a generation was 272,666 shares daily. For 20 weeks daily volume has not averaged 400,000 shares. Half of this time the average has been under 300,000 shares. Volume is and has been at a low extreme for months. Neither the decline of this year nor unfavorable news has developed sizeable nor increasingly sustained volume. The inference is that liquidation has run its course and that the final phase of the major decline has been completed.

Conditional upon the industrial and rail averages holding above their recent lows of 92.92 and 23.31, there is ample justification to presume that a bear market has been completed and that a bull market has set in. The breaking of these lows by both averages will invalidate this presumption; the plotting of the three movements previously described will confirm it. Written as of July 3, 1942. Industrial average, 104.49; rail average, 25.02.

Justin Barbour

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The piece below was written by the great Dow Theorist, E. George Schaefer. I consider this piece one of the greatest market calls in the history of Wall Street.

The Dow had hit bottom on June 13, 1949, at 161.60. Within a week of the extreme bottom Schaefer wrote this amazing piece and sent it to his subscribers.

Read it with care. What Schaefer writes here is not only an incredible historical document, but it is the very essence of Dow Theory.

Those who bought stocks here, and I was one of them, were buying stocks at the very beginning of one of the greatest bull markets in Wall Street history.

Richard Russell


“THE DOW THEORY TRADER”

E. George Schaefer

NO TRADER CAN AFFORD TO IGNORE THE DOW THEORY

Saturday, June 18, 1949

MARKET PSYCHOLOGY － When the consensus of opinion among the ‘crowd’ has reached the point where it confidently expects the stock market to decline; market psychology suggests that the bottom of the bear market may not be far away. On Monday and Tuesday of the past week a most bearish market psychology prevailed among the trading public as the low closes of the past 2½ year’s trading range was violated. Short selling became quite popular as those positions were precariously extended on the occasion. A rapid deterioration of any remaining bullish confidence was evident as the bears exuberantly predicted considerably lower prices for the market place. Statements such as, ‘You haven’t seen anything yet’, and ‘You will be able to buy them at half the price’ were frequently heard in brokerage rooms. These are manifestations representing the most depressed psychology of a bear market. The lowest ebb of investment confidence among the public is always apparent at the lowest points in bear markets.

When the trading public becomes certain that the stock market will decline, astute traders and investors will regard this as a bullish symptom for the future trend of stocks. Exactly the reverse was true one year ago, when the cycle reached its opposite extreme and a feeling of certainty existed that the market would continue to advance. Market history is filled with instances where the ‘crowd’ became bearish at the bottom and bullish on top. The present case is, we believe, no exception. The bear market has reached a stage where an overwhelmingly bearish psychological condition is at hand. Based on precedent, the present situation warrants close observance for a turning point in the market.


The intensity of the situation is reflected in the over-crowded short interest that present-day short sellers are confidently ignoring. When the latest short interest total is published within the next few days, it will probably represent the largest since 1932, when one of the worst depressions in the nation’s history was at hand. An abnormally large short interest has always served to electrify swift and large advances in the stock market, and the present case will be no exception. The longer the downtrend persists with an increase in total short positions, the more sensational will be the advance when it finally materializes.


BULLISH FACTORS ─ During the past three years, market swings have been relatively narrow, and, under the Dow Theory, three changes in primary trend have occurred. A bear primary trend was in effect from May-June, 1946, to May, 1947. A bull classification was given the primary trend from May, 1947, to June-July, 1948. At the present time, another primary bear trend has been under way since the highs of June-July, 1948. Each of the first two primary trends were of approximately one year’s duration, and the present primary bear trend is again at the one-year mark. If the current bear market is to correct only those excesses which occurred in the preceding bull market, a sufficient correction in both time and extent have already been made. This factor favors another change from bear to bull in the primary trend in the near future.

Up to this writing, the market has not penetrated the intra-day lows of its 2¥-year trading range. Until a decisive breakout of this area occurs, the averages could advance and test the upper limits of the area, or continue to fluctuate within that range for an extended period of time. The industrial average established an intra-day low of 160.49 in October, 1946, and the rail average recorded its extreme intra-day low of 40.43 in May, 1947. These lows were closely approached by both averages during the past week, but were not violated. On Tuesday, the extreme intra-day lows of the current bear market were recorded at 160.62 and 40.88. A slight decrease in volume was noted at the lows, while odd-lot short sale orders skyrocketed to 121 on the very low day. The fact that the market refused to give a decisive downside penetration of its long 2¥-year trading area implies that a rally from those lows will develop after a sufficient test of those lows has been made.

Another bullish tinge was given the market by the appearance of a ‘gap’ of .24 in the industrial average on the downside on Monday. The possibility appears that this might have been an ‘exhaustion gap’, indicating that the market is becoming exhausted on the downside from its prolonged decline since March 30. More often than not, a gap occurring after a long decline signifies the end of that decline is near, and that an advance in the averages will follow.

An increasingly bullish factor in recent statistics has been the trend toward higher yields. At the intra-day lows of the past week, the 30 Dow-Jones industrials showed an average yield of 6.91%, while the 20 Dow-Jones rail stocks showed 9.12%. These high yields are approaching the extreme highs in yields recorded on only three other occasions during the past 17 years. The bear market lows of 1932, 1938, and 1942 were accompanied by peak yields in the Dow-Jones industrials of 10.38%, 8.07%, and 7.97%, respectively. A declining tendency in these peaks is noted, and, therefore, the current 6.91% peak may be in close proximity to the peak to be established in this bear market. A declining tendency has also been in effect for yields at the top of bull markets. In the bull markets which culminated in 1937, 1938, and 1946, the Dow-Jones industrials yielded 3.70%, 3.44%, and 3.23%, respectively.


CONCLUSIONS － The philosophy of Charles H. Dow always gave first consideration to values, then to economic conditions, and third, to the action of both the industrial and rail averages. When the low point of a bear market is being approached, values will give us the first indication of a change in trend. In the past 17 years only three opportunities presented themselves to buy stocks at great values, and now the fourth opportunity is making its appearance. We continue to regard stocks as having entered a ‘buying area’ on a basis of values. Good dividend paying issues should be purchased during periods of market weakness, and held until such time as yields for the industrial average are back into the 3% to 3½ % area. Once stocks are purchased, both the minor and secondary movements in the market should be completely disregarded. A new period of prosperity will follow, once the present recession has run its full course. From present indications, the current business recession will continue until later this year and possibly into 1950. Following that a two-to-five year period of prosperity will be sparked by a good foreign trade situation and by strong activity in the building and automotive industries. Television and other new industries will continue to flourish, and confidence will be placed in the stock market as it climbs back to a point where yields are close to the 3% point again. Based on present prices, earnings, and yields in the senior average, computations indicate that the eventual highs of the next bull market will be recorded in the 325 to 375 area.

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Mr.Business

Dow Theory Letters的文章。。。

December 20th 1974         Special Report

PAGE 1         



This is a special Letter . If there are typos, please excuse us . Why a special? Because certain ideas have clarified in my mind, ideas that I introduced in the last few letters, and I want to get them to you now. I do change and alter my ideas - that's why I publish 36 Letters a year instead of a dozen!

"Consider the work of God; who can set straight what he has made crooked? When times are prosperous, enjoy your happiness ; when times are bad, consider this: The one is God's doing, as is the other, in order that man may know nothing of his destiny. . ., . " Ecclesiastes 7:13


THE MARKET: Like the Biblical writer above, we know little of our personal destiny or our investment destiny . I have succeeded so far in keeping my subscribers out of the worst market collapse since 1929-32. For eight years I have held steady to a policy of cash (or Treasury bills), gold shares and unlimited patience . I presume that I must have done something right, because over the past year (during these most difficult times) subscriptions to this report have. doubled, taking them to the highest level in seventeen- years .

I am most grateful to my veteran subscribers and to my many new ones. I know that in a time of recession, universal gloom and shattering losses, a check for $95 for an investment service is not an easy thing to part with. I hope that some of the market losses that were avoided (if you followed my advice) more than make up for the cost of a subscription. At any rate, I find that I am sweating just as much this year as last . And that isn't because of the increased subscription list, it's because Wall Street isn't getting any easier (or perhaps I'm not getting any smarter) .

On to the market : Turning to the long chart on page 1, let's see what is happening to the various indices and averages which we are using to measure the depth (or the death) of the great bear. On December 13 and again on December 16 the Primary Trend Index or PTI (which is my own composite of eight critical indices and averages) recorded brand new bear market lows. On December 16 the advance-decline ratio for the NYSE recorded another bear market low. But note that none of the Averages, our gauges of the actual price movement, have confirmed on the downside .

As a rule, the longer a primary trend is in force, the less the significance of preceding points in the Averages. Thus, I show a bear market low of 116. 69 in 1970 for the D-J Transports.

Four years have elapsed since that low, and I therefore do not accord too much importance to that earlier low. However, the Transports struck a low of 125.93 on October 3, 1974 . One day later (Oct 4) the Industrials touched a low of 584. 56 . On December 6 Industrials broke to a new bear market low of 577. 60 (see page 1 chart) . Transports have not yet confirmed . This could prove to be very significant . Time will tell. Also on the significant list is the fact that so far, the D-J Utilities, the D-J Bonds and the S S P 500 Average have refused to confirm the December 6 low on the Dow. The longer this condition prevails, the more hopeful the overall picture for the market in general .

Question : Russell, are you saying that we could have seen a major bear market bottom? Answer: I'm saying that it is possible, that I now feel better than 50/50 about it. Frankly, there are a number of phenomena I would like to see, but as I have said so often, they don't run the market for Richard Russell . For instance, I would like to see much more odd-lot shorting, I would like to see more skepticism on the part of advisories concerning the periodic rallies . I would like to see even blacker sentiment (regarding securities) than we now see . I would like to see the Averages form a dragging, low-volume bottom . I would like to see stocks act totally immune to bad news (although they still get hit somewhat when bad news emerges) .


Page 2

Question : Russell, I want to pin you down. Do you think we have seen the bottom? Answer : You're asking me a question that I have no right to answer at this time. Remember, after eight years of "promising" my readers that the market was most definitely going lower, I have now decided to let the market show me that it is or is not going lower. Second point : All bear market bottoms are identified in retrospect (except by those geniuses who call the "bear market bottom" all the way down, and who, like the clock that stopped, are eventually correct) .

Subscribers should remember too that it is not necessary to pin-point the ultimate bottom of a bear market .The bottom could be here, it could arrive in a week, a month or six months. We have been in the third phase of the bear market . When the Averages produce a primary bull signal or when our moving averages of the Dow and our Dow momentum turn up, we will know that the tide has turned.

Question : What would a Dow Theory bull signal entail at this point? Answer : The last joint laws in the Averages were recorded October 3 and 4 (see chart 4). Next we had -a rally to the November 4 Industrial peak of 674.75 and the . November 6 Transport peak of 156. 61. A new decline of secondary proportions took Industrials to the recent December 6 low of 577 . 60 . The same decline took Transports to a December 16 low of 138 .31 .

If any forthcoming advance (and we are now in one) succeeds in taking the two Averages above their November peaks (Industrials 674.75, Transports 156 . 61 ) I am going to call a new primary bull market . It's as simple as that .

Question : What do we do if that happens, Russell? Answer : If we get a bull signal, neither I nor any one else on the face of the globe knows how extensive the bull market will be or how long it will last . It could be a five-year whopper or it could be a one-year disappointment (or a one-year explosion for that matter) .

At any rate, if we get a bull signal I would recommend moving 25% of your funds into a no-load (no commission) mutual fund as the first move. Individual stocks will then be discussed as we move along. But as to the fund, it should be one that has a good record of performing in an "up market, " and I will leave this to you and your broker. (If you haven't got a competent and knowledgeable broker by now, this is the time to get one). I might add that Growth Fund Guide, PO Box 2109, San Clemente, CA 92672, ($39 annually) contains invaluable research on the "growth funds" .

Question: Suppose one or both of the Averages refuse to better the 674.75 (Industrial) and 156 . 61 (Transport) high of November, 1974 and they then turn down and break to new bear market lows? Answer: If that happens, we're still in the bear market's third phase.

Question : What about buying some stocks now? Is it necessary to get proof of a new bull market before buying? Answer : Nothing in . Dow's Theory states that it is necessary to wait for a Dow Theory bull signal before buying .
The bull signal represents technical confirmation that we were correct - that a bear market bottom indeed did occur.

Now this is how I view it . I think the odds are probably better than 50/ 50 that the Dow and most shares hit a bottom in December, 1974. I put this thesis together with a number of other facts. As you will see in a later section, the unweighted NYSE average is now down around 77% from the high. In 1929-32 the unweighted NYSE average went 12% further on the downside - to an 89% loss. I feel that most shares have now discounted all the forthcoming bad news, and I am including recession-depression conditions in 1975 . We have been in the third phase of a great primary bear market .We are finally in the zone of "great values" . In many cases, stocks are selling "below known values" . Here's an interesting statistic : The price/ earnings ratio for the 30-Dow Industrials is now around 6. 0 while the yield on the Dow is 6.36. This means that the Dow P/E is below the yield on the Dow . This happened only once before in the last forty years, and that was during 1948-50.

Second item: The Dow is now selling below its book (or break-up) value . This has not occurred since 1942. Are these two above Dow "tests" infallible indications of the final bottom? Not at all, but they do indicate that the Dow is sure getting down there .

Last week Value Line ran a very clever advertisement. They listed 18 NYSE stocks including such issues as Telex, Ampex, Pan Am, Lockheed, General Steel, Avco, Lear Siegler, United Brands, etc . - eighteen of them. "At their pre-1971 highs, the average price . per share for any ONE of these stocks worked out to $50. Today, " said Value Lines, "you could buy ALL 18 for less than $50. ~~ I read the ad and I said to myself, "Value Line is talking values . I can't argue with that ad ."

Many readers may remember the median price study from Letter 599 (a study that I keep abreast of courtesy of Prof. S . L. Davis, Case Western Reserve University) . This study shows the median price of all stocks on the NYSE or the middle price . The median price is now 12 .3, a fraction off its 1974 low of 12 .2 . This means that half of the stocks on the NYSE are currently priced below 12 .2 and half above 12 . 2 . The lowest point since 1920 for the median was the 7 . 0 of July 9, 1932.

All right, I've talked about values.The fact is that a very long list of good stocks have lost 75% to 90% of their value. I do not see anything wrong with beginning accumulation inthese shares now. I think the downside risk in these shares is very limited . I think a package of five or preferably ten or more of these issues should work out well in the period ahead. I think that even if the Dow breaks again to the tune of another 100 points, these stocks would tend to hold.

Here is a representative list of stocks that I personally like, get your broker on them to find out dividends, earnings, etc . (This is your chance to get your broker to move his fanny!) . G. D. Searle. Bell & Howell, Reynolds Metals, Uniroyal, Coca Cola of NY, McGraw Hill, Holiday Inns, Kaiser Cement, Food Fair, Fairchild Industries, Clorox, Miles Laboratory, Cluett Peabody, Spring Mills, Woolworth, General Host, Faberge, Macy's, Miles Laboratory, Pennzoil, Texaco.


Page 3

Question : Russell, how is it that you don't recommend putting all of your assets into the market on a bull signal? Why not get fully invested? Answer : If you remember, I said in the last Letter that a true bear market goes throughintense deflation and liquidation, not only in the stock market (which has already occurred) but in the economy (and this has not occurred) . I said that if this economy did not go through the big liquidation, then any bull market that developed could be sub-standard in duration and extent. I feel that a bull market which materialized in this area could be a sort of "abbreviated bull" . Therefore, with subscribers still holding 25% in gold items and putting another perhaps 15% to 20% in some of the issues listed above, and finally placing 25% of remaining funds into a no-load fund (on a primary bull signal), I feel we would be in the correct stance . This stance would allow us to gain from 'a bull market that would almost surely be fueled by a new round of monetary inflation (rather than a bull market that grew out of a natural foundation of intense liquidation and real, pent-up demand) .



Question : Russell, what about the panic for cash and the profit collapse which you foresaw for 1975? Answer: They may well be coming, and today's prices may have discounted them. But I never argue with the market, and the fact is that the last confirmed lows in the Averages were made on October 3 and 4 (Industrials 584. 56. Transports 125 . 93) . Both Averages have not been lower since . Industrials have been lower, but that constituted a non-confirmation .

The extent of the damage brought in by the bear market is shown in this chart by Trade Levels, 301 E . Colo. Blvd., Pasadena CA 91101 .This unweighted chart shows the disastrous story of the last number of years . There's been only one worse collapse in Wall Street history.

The 1-2-3 notations should be clear to all who followed my earlier discussion of the Elliott Wave Principle . Bear markets come in major 1-2-3 waves. According to the chart, this major downward zig-zag could be completed .

Question : What about the gold shares and gold coins, what do we do with them? Answer : My gold share/bullion ratio chart broke up last week in favor of the metal (coins) over the shares (see chart, last Letter) . I consider the coins to be a survival hedge, our treasure trove of real, honest-to-God money. The shares should be held for what looks like a move coming up into the first quarter . At that point I will have to make a decision on where we stand with the gold shares . At this point, I would say that the downside for gold shares has been well tested, and that they should be held as a leveraged hedge against what could be coming up in 1975-76, namely, the biggest spate of monetary inflation yet (the December Bank Credit Analyst states that it could take a 20% to 25% expansion of the money supply to move the economy out of this gathering recession) . A thought: What happens if the 2 million ounces of gold that the Treasury is "auctioning off in January is gobbled up? I would say that such action would constitute a big plus for gold (already it is rumored that the Arabs may take the whole batch) .


Page 4

Below are weekly charts of some of the ,stocks I like . The first figures in the tiny boxes represent the quarterly earnings, the second figures represent earnings for the last four quarters ( for instance, CLU shows 10 cents for the third quarter's earnings and 61 cents for the four quarters ending with third quarter 1974 (charts courtesy of Quote, PO Box 213, Wichita, KS 67201) . NOTE: The next Letter will be mailed January 2 unless Wall Street does something so outlandish I have to get out another "special" . In closing, I want to wish my loyal readers all the best for the New Year.









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[ 本帖最后由 Mr.Business 于 16-10-2008 05:58 PM 编辑 ]

Mr.Business

Dow Theory Letters的文章。。。

Rich Man, Poor Man (The Power of Compounding)

MAKING MONEY:  The most popular piece I've published in 40 years of writing these Letters was entitled, "Rich Man, Poor Man." I have had dozens of requests to run this piece again or for permission to reprint it for various business organizations.

Making money entails a lot more than predicting which way the stock or bond markets are heading or trying to figure which stock or fund will double over the next few years. For the great majority of investors, making money requires a plan, self-discipline and desire. I say, "for the great majority of people" because if you're a Steven Spielberg or a Bill Gates you don't have to know about the Dow or the markets or about yields or price/earnings ratios. You're a phenomenon in your own field, and you're going to make big money as a by-product of your talent and ability. But this kind of genius is rare.

For the average investor, you and me, we're not geniuses so we have to have a financial plan. In view of this, I offer below a few items that we must be aware of if we are serious about making money.

Rule 1: Compounding: One of the most important lessons for living in the modern world is that to survive you've got to have money. But to live (survive) happily, you must have love, health (mental and physical), freedom, intellectual stimulation -- and money. When I taught my kids about money, the first thing I taught them was the use of the "money bible." What's the money bible? Simple, it's a volume of the compounding interest tables.

Compounding is the royal road to riches. Compounding is the safe road, the sure road, and fortunately, anybody can do it. To compound successfully you need the following:  perseverance in order to keep you firmly on the savings path. You need intelligence in order to understand what you are doing and why. And you need a knowledge of the mathematics tables in order to comprehend the amazing rewards that will come to you if you faithfully follow the compounding road. And, of course, you need time, time to allow the power of compounding to work for you. Remember, compounding only works through time.

But there are two catches in the compounding process. The first is obvious -- compounding may involve sacrifice (you can't spend it and still save it). Second, compounding  is boring -- b-o-r-i-n-g. Or I should say it's boring until (after seven or eight years) the money starts to pour in. Then, believe me, compounding becomes very interesting. In fact, it becomes downright fascinating!

In order to emphasize the power of compounding, I am including this extraordinary study, courtesy of Market Logic, of Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33306. In this study we assume that investor (B) opens an IRA at age 19. For seven consecutive periods he puts $2,000 in his IRA at an average growth rate of 10% (7% interest plus growth). After seven years this fellow makes NO MORE contributions -- he's finished.

A second investor (A) makes no contributions until age 26 (this is the age when investor B was finished with his contributions). Then A continues faithfully to contribute $2,000 every year until he's 65 (at the same theoretical 10% rate).

Now study the incredible results. B, who made his contributions earlier and who made only seven contributions, ends up with MORE money than A, who made 40 contributions but at a LATER TIME. The difference in the two is that B had seven more early years of compounding than A. Those seven early years were worth more than all of A's 33 additional contributions.

This is a study that I suggest you show to your kids. It's a study I've lived by, and I can tell you, "It works." You can work your compounding with muni-bonds, with a good money market fund, with T-bills or say with five-year T-notes.


table1

Rule 2: DON'T LOSE MONEY: This may sound naive, but believe me it isn't. If you want to be wealthy, you must not lose money, or I should say must not lose BIG money. Absurd rule, silly rule? Maybe, but MOST PEOPLE LOSE MONEY in disastrous investments, gambling, rotten business deals, greed, poor timing. Yes, after almost five decades of investing and talking to investors, I can tell you that most people definitely DO lose money, lose big time -- in the stock market, in options and futures, in real estate, in bad loans, in mindless gambling, and in their own business.

RULE 3: RICH MAN, POOR MAN: In the investment world the wealthy investor has one major advantage over the little guy, the stock market amateur and the neophyte trader. The advantage that the wealthy investor enjoys is that HE DOESN'T NEED THE MARKETS. I can't begin to tell you what a difference that makes, both in one's mental attitude and in the way one actually handles one's money.

The wealthy investor doesn't need the markets, because he already has all the income he needs. He has money coming in via bonds, T-bills, money market funds, stocks and real estate. In other words, the wealthy investor never feels pressured  to "make money" in the market.

The wealthy investor tends to be an expert on values. When bonds are cheap and bond yields are irresistibly high, he buys bonds. When stocks are on the bargain table and stock yields are attractive, he buys stocks. When real estate is a great value, he buys real estate. When great art or fine jewelry or gold is on the "give away" table, he buys art or diamonds or gold. In other words, the wealthy investor puts his money where the great  values are.

And if no outstanding values are available, the wealthy investors waits. He can afford to wait. He has money coming in daily, weekly, monthly. The wealthy investor knows what he is looking for, and he doesn't mind waiting months or even years for his next investment (they call that patience).

But what about the little guy? This fellow always feels pressured to "make money." And in return he's always pressuring the market to "do something" for him. But sadly, the market isn't interested. When the little guy isn't buying stocks offering 1% or 2% yields, he's off to Las Vegas or Atlantic City trying to beat the house at roulette. Or he's spending 20 bucks a week on lottery tickets, or he's "investing" in some crackpot scheme that his neighbor told him about (in strictest confidence, of course).

And because the little guy is trying to force the market to do something for him, he's a guaranteed loser. The little guy doesn't understand values so he constantly overpays. He doesn't comprehend the power of compounding, and he doesn't understand money. He's never heard the adage, "He who understands interest -- earns it. He who doesn't understand interest -- pays it."  The little guy is the typical American, and he's deeply in debt.

The little guy is in hock up to his ears. As a result, he's always sweating -- sweating to make payments on his house, his refrigerator, his car or his lawn mower. He's impatient, and he feels perpetually put upon. He tells himself that he has to make money -- fast. And he dreams of those "big, juicy mega-bucks." In the end, the little guy wastes his money in the market, or he loses his money gambling, or he dribbles it away on senseless schemes. In short, this "money-nerd" spends his life dashing up the financial down-escalator.

But here's the ironic part of it. If, from the beginning, the little guy had adopted a strict policy of never spending more than he made, if he had taken his extra savings and compounded it in intelligent, income-producing securities, then in due time he'd have money coming in daily, weekly, monthly, just like the rich man. The little guy would have become a financial winner, instead of a pathetic loser.

RULE 4: VALUES: The only time the average investor should stray outside the basic compounding system is when a given market offers outstanding value. I judge an investment to be a great value when it offers (a) safety; (b) an attractive return; and (c) a good chance of appreciating in price. At all other times, the compounding route is safer and probably a lot more profitable, at least in the long run.

http://ww2.dowtheoryletters.com/ ... _man__poor_man.html

Mr.Business

Dow Theory Letters的文章。。。

The Perfect Business

AH PERFECTION: Strange, but the most popular, the most widely-requested, and the most widely quoted piece I've ever written was not about the stock market -- it was about business, and specifically about what I call the theoretical "ideal business." I first published this piece in the early-1970s. I repeated it in Letter 881 and then again in Letter 982. I've added a few thoughts in each successive edition. But seldom does a month go by when I don't get requests from subscribers or from some publication or corporation to republish "the ideal business." So here it is again -- with a few added comments.

I once asked a friend, a prominent New York corporate lawyer, "Dave, in all your years of experience, what was the single best business you've ever come across?" Without hesitation, Dave answered, "I have a client whose sole business is manufacturing a chemical that is critical in making synthetic rubber. This chemical is used in very small quantities in rubber manufacturing, but it is absolutely essential and can be used in only super-refined form.

"My client is the only one who manufactures this chemical. He therefore owns a virtual monopoly since this chemical is extremely difficult to manufacture and not enough of it is used to warrant another company competing with him. Furthermore, since the rubber companies need only small quantities of this chemical, they don't particularly care what they pay for it -- as long as it meets their very demanding specifications. My client is a millionaire many times over, and his business is the best I've ever come across." I was fascinated by the lawyer's story, and I never forgot it.

When I was a young man and just out of college my father gave me a few words of advice. Dad had loads of experience; he had been in the paper manufacturing business; he had been assistant to Mr. Sam Bloomingdale (of Bloomingdale's Department store); he had been in construction (he was a civil engineer); and he was also an expert in real estate management.

Here's what my dad told me: "Richard, stay out of the retail business. The hours are too long, and you're dealing with every darn variable under the sun. Stay out of real estate; when hard times arrive real estate comes to a dead stop and then it collapses. Furthermore, real estate is illiquid. When the collapse comes, you can't unload. Get into manufacturing; make something people can use. And make something that you can sell to the world. But Richard, my boy, if you're really serious about making money, get into the money business. It's clean, you can use your brains, you can get rid of your inventory and your mistakes in 30 seconds, and your product, money, never goes out of fashion."

So much for my father's wisdom (which was obviously tainted by the Great Depression). But Dad was a very wise man. For my own part, I've been in a number of businesses -- from textile designing to advertising to book publishing to owning a night club to the investment advisory business.

It's said that every business needs (1) a dreamer, (2) a businessman, and (3) a S.O.B. Well, I don't know about number 3, but most successful businesses do have a number 3 or all too often they seem to have a combined number 2 and number 3.

Bill Gates is known as "America's richest man." Bully for Billy. But do you know what Gates' biggest coup was? When Gates was dealing with IBM, Big Blue needed an operating system for their computer. Gates didn't have one, but he knew where to find one. A little outfit in Seattle had one. Gates bought the system for a mere $50,000 and presented it to IBM. That was the beginning of Microsoft's rise to power. Lesson: It's not enough to have the product, you have to know and understand your market. Gates didn't have the product, but he knew the market -- and he knew where to acquire the product.

Apple had by far the best product in the Mac. But Apple made a monumental mistake. They refused to license ALL PC manufacturers to use the Mac operating system. If they had, Apple today could be  Microsoft, and Gates would still be trying to come out with something useful (the fact is Microsoft has been a follower and a great marketer, not an innovator). "Find a need and fill it," runs the old adage. Maybe today they should change that to, "Dream up a need and fill it." That's what has happened in the world of computers. And it will happen again and again.

All right, let's return to that wonderful world of perfection. I spent a lot of time and thought in working up the criteria for what I've termed the IDEAL BUSINESS. Now obviously, the ideal business doesn't exist and probably never will. But if you're about to start a business or join someone else's business or if you want to buy a business, the following list may help you. The more of these criteria that you can apply to your new business or new job, the better off you'll be.

(1) The ideal business sells the world, rather than a single neighborhood or even a single city or state. In other words, it has an unlimited global market (and today this is more important than ever, since world markets have now opened up to an extent unparalleled in my lifetime). By the way, how many times have you seen a retail store that has been doing well for years -- then another bigger and better retail store moves nearby, and it's kaput for the first store.

(2) The ideal business offers a product which enjoys an "inelastic" demand. Inelastic refers to a product that people need or desire -- almost regardless of price.

(3) The ideal business sells a product which cannot be easily substituted or copied. This means that the product is an original or at least it's something that can be copyrighted or patented.

(4) The ideal business has minimal labor requirements (the fewer personnel, the better). Today's example of this is the much-talked about "virtual corporation." The virtual corporation may consist of an office with three executives, where literally all manufacturing and services are farmed out to other companies.

(5) The ideal business enjoys low overhead. It does not need an expensive location; it does not need large amounts of electricity, advertising, legal advice, high-priced employees, large inventory, etc.

(6) The ideal business does not require big cash outlays or major investments in equipment. In other words, it does not tie up your capital (incidentally, one of the major reasons for new-business failure is under-capitalization).

(7) The ideal business enjoys cash billings. In other words, it does not tie up your capital with lengthy or complex credit terms.

(8) The ideal business is relatively free of all kinds of government and industry regulations and strictures (and if you're now in your own business, you most definitely know what I mean with this one).

(9) The ideal business is portable or easily moveable. This means that you can take your business (and yourself) anywhere you want -- Nevada, Florida, Texas, Washington, S. Dakota (none have state income taxes) or hey, maybe even Monte Carlo or Switzerland or the south of France.

(10) Here's a crucial one that's often overlooked; the ideal business satisfies your intellectual (and often emotional) needs. There's nothing like being fascinated with what you're doing. When that happens, you're not working, you're having fun.

(11) The ideal business leaves you with free time. In other words, it doesn't require your labor and attention 12, 16 or 18 hours a day (my lawyer wife, who leaves the house at 6:30 AM and comes home at 6:30 PM and often later, has been well aware of this one).

(12) Super-important: the ideal business is one in which your income is not limited by your personal output (lawyers and doctors have this problem). No, in the ideal business you can sell 10,000 customers as easily as you sell one (publishing is an example).

That's it. If you use this list it may help you cut through a lot of nonsense and hypocrisy and wishes and dreams regarding what you are looking for in life and in your work. None of us own or work at the ideal business. But it's helpful knowing what we're looking for and dealing with. As a buddy of mine once put it, "I can't lay an egg and I can't cook, but I know what a great omelet looks like and tastes like."

http://ww2.dowtheoryletters.com/ ... rfect_business.html

Mr.Business

Dow Theory Letters的文章。。。

HOPE:  It's human nature to be optimistic. It's human nature to hope. Furthermore, hope is a component of a healthy state of mind. Hope is the opposite of negativity. Negativity in life can lead to anger, disappointment and depression. After all, if the world is a negative place, what's the point of living in it? To be negative is to be anti-life.

Ironically, it doesn't work that way in the stock market. In the stock market hope is a hindrence, not a help. Once you take a position in a stock, you obviously want that stock to advance. But if the stock that you bought is a real value, and you bought it right -- you should be content to sit with that stock in the knowledge that over time its value will out without your help, without your hoping.

So in the case of this stock, you have value on your side -- and all you need is patience. In the end, your patience will pay off with a higher price for your stock. Hope shouldn't play any part in this process. You don't need hope, because you bought the stock when it was a great value, and you bought it at the right time.

Any time you find yourself hoping in this business, the odds are that you are on the wrong path -- or that you did something stupid that should be corrected.

Unfortuneately hope is a money-loser in the investment business. This is counter-intuitive but true. Hope will keep you riding a stock that is headed down. Hope will keep you from taking a small loss and instead, allowing that small loss to develop into a large loss.

In the stock market hope get in the way of reality, hope gets in the way of common sense. One of the first rules in investing is "Don't take the big loss." In order to do that, you've got to be willing to take a small loss.

If the stock market turns bearish, and you're staying put with your whole position. and you're HOPING that what you see is not really happening – then welcome to poverty city. In this situation, all your hoping isn't going to save you or make you a penny. In fact, in this situation hoping is the devil that bids you to sit -- while your portfolio of stocks goes down the drain.

In the investing business my suggestion is that you avoid hope. Forget the siren, hope -- instead embrace cold, clear reality.

http://ww2.dowtheoryletters.com/ ... edia/body_hope.html

Mr.Business

Dow Theory Letters的文章。。。

Bonds

A PRIMER ON BONDS:  The bond market is massive, actually dwarfing the market in stocks.  Almost all my subscriber have some familiarity and experience with common stocks. Bonds are another story. Most subscribers (and their brokers, I might add) know little about bonds. Most subscribers have never bought a bond, and many brokers have never sold a bond.

Because bonds may be an increasingly important addition to your portfolio, I want to present this very basic information on bonds.  

First, what is a bond? A bond is a debt security. It represent a loan from the government, a state, a county or municipality, or it can represent a loan from a corporation. A bond is  simply a unit of debt that a borrower sells  to an investor.  

A bond is called a fixed income security because the interest rate or "coupon" that the investor receives at the time that the bond is issued remains fixed. The coupon does not change once the bond is issued.

When you buy a bond which provides a certain yield at the time of purchase, that is the yield you will receive on your original investment regardless of whether the bond rises or falls  in price in the open market. For instance, say you buy a bond that has a 5% coupon and you buy the bond for a thousand dollars. No matter where that bond goes in the open market, you're going to receive that fixed rate of 5% or $50 per each thousand dollar bond.

Bonds are almost always issued in denominations of one thousand dollars, but bonds are quoted in percentages. In other words, a bond which is quoted at 100 or par would sell for exactly one thousand dollars, par equaling one thousand.

Interest rates in the open market change almost daily. These daily changes effect the daily  market price of bonds. Bonds move inversely with prevailing interest rates. As interest rates move up, the price of bonds moves down, -- and as interest rates decline, the price of  bonds moves up.

Now suppose interest rates rise on  the open market. Your bond will decline in price so that its interest will be in line with the market's interest. But regardless, you will continue to receive your $50 a year interest on your bond, even though the market price of your bond is lower (most bonds pay semi-annually or twice a year).

This is important – if  say rates decline and your bond rises, you then have to decide whether to keep the bond and continue to collect your $50 a year or to sell your bond at a profit -- but you can't have your cake and eat it too. In other words, you have to decide whether to continue collecting your 5% interest or whether to take the profit (and pay the taxes on your capital gains).  

Of course, if you sell your bond and  take the profit, you then have the problem of what to do with the  money. If you want to buy more bonds, you're probably going to get less yield, because as I said, rates were going down, which is why your bond rallied in the first place.

As for bond yields, there are three items to consider. The first is the bond's yield to maturity, which is the yield based on holding the bond to maturity.

The second is the yield to call, meaning the yield if the bond is called at a certain price (the call price is stated when you buy the bond).

The third item is the yield based on the day or the hour you buy the bond.

Not all bonds are callable. But if a bond is callable, you want to know at what date that bond is callable and at what price it is callable. That could be a problem if you pay a premium for a bond. Say you buy a bond that is now selling for 113 and the bond is callable at 102. If the bond is called at 102 you're going to face a loss of 11 points. For this reason, I try to buy bonds that are selling at a discount rather than a premium, since a discounted bond is far less likely to be called.

Example – if I buy a bond for 78 and it's callable at 102, why would the issuer call the bond at 102 when the company could go into the open market at buy the bond at 78? They wouldn't, and that's the advantage of a discounted bond that's callable at a much higher price. The bond just isn't likely to be called.

I  have called compounding "the royal road to riches." That's because if you buy a security that pays a good dividend or a decent rate of interest and you reinvest the dividends or the interest, then  the compounding effect become very powerful over time.

The compounding effect is very important with bonds, even more so than with stocks, because in bonds you know exactly how much income is coming in. Furthermore,  most bonds today provide a much higher return than do stocks.

Many died-in-the-wool bond investors follow a system of reinvesting their bond income, and thus they follow a policy of compounding through time.

If you compound long enough,  the compounding effect becomes so powerful that after a number of years you'll be accumulating so much money that the original cost of the bonds becomes a non-factor. In other words, the increase in value of your overall portfolio will dwarf the cost of the bond that you bought earlier in the program.

The safest and most liquid bonds are bonds issued by the US government.  The next safest bonds are those issued by a government agency. Treasury debt issued by the US government is extremely safe because it carries the full faith and credit of the US government.

Treasury bills or T-bills are sold in maturities of 91-days,  26 weeks or 52 weeks, and they are quoted in discounted form. In other words, you may buy a T-bill at $988 (it's always discounted) but it will mature in 91 days at par or one thousand.

T-notes are maturites of over one year up to ten years. They are quoted in 32nds of a point. When they talk about a T-note at 95.10 they mean 98 and 10/32nds of one thousand dollars.

US Treasury bonds are issued in maturities of more than 10 years. Some Treasuries are callable, meaning that at the government's option, the bonds can be called back to the Treasury at a fixed price and at a fixed time which is stated in the bond's original description. The bonds, if they are callable, will be called at par or 1000. T-bonds pay semi-annually.

By the way, Treasury bills, notes and bonds are taxable by the federal government, but they are free of state taxes.

The US government authorizes certain agencies to issue bonds. The Federal Farm Credit Banks the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., the Government National Mortgage Association, the Inter-American Development Bank, they are all managed and backed by the US government. The Federal National Mortgage Association, Federal Home Loan Banks and the Student Loan  Marketing Association are run by private corporations but they do have the quasi-backing of the US government.

OK, now for municipal bonds. Municipal or "muni" bonds are securities that represent loans by investors to a state or a municipality or a city or a legally constituted subdivision of a state or a US territory (Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands). Munis are issued to finance public works and construction projects or even loans to universities -- always something that will benefit the public.

Munis vary in safety, and they are rated by a few rating agencies. Munis range in maturies from a month to half a century. Munis are usually exempt from federal taxation, and if you buy a muni that is issued in your own state, the bond is usually exempt from both federal and your own state's taxes.

The two types of munis are GOs or general obligation bonds which carry the full faith and credit of the issuer, and revenue bonds which are backed by the revenue which comes from the facility that is being financed.

I'm not going to go into corporate bonds, because I prefer either government bills, notes, bonds (highest safety) or munis (tax free).

When buying munis, I prefer buying munis that are rated AA or AAA on their own. However,  many munis are insured by agencies, and if insured by a recognized agency the rating companies usually gives them an AAA rating.

I've been asked, "How good are the agencies which insure these bonds in the case of a national disaster?"  I don’t have the answer to that one.  Which is why I prefer muni bonds that are so solid that they are rated AA or AAA on their own, based on their superior credit worthiness.

Remember, bonds can advance sharply in an environment where interest rates are dropping. But bonds can also hit the skids in an environment where interest rates are rising.

Bonds are particularly sensitive to inflation or deflation. As a rule, bonds do not do well in an inflationary environment. Since World War II the US has tended to be on an inflationary path – thus, the public's increasing affection for stocks over bonds. But there are times when bonds will outperform stocks, such as during the first half of 2001.

Stocks and bonds both have their place in portfolios. In bear markets, you usually do best in high-grade bonds. In bull markets stocks (if purchased at the right time) will almost always beat bonds.

If you want to buy bonds, you can buy them over the internet or you can buy them through a broker. Personally, I prefer a broker, but important – he or she must be a broker who is thoroughly familiar with bonds. Most brokerage office have one or more brokers who specialize in bonds, and these are the brokers I would use (the great majority of  brokers sell stocks or funds – for this reason, most brokers are not familiar with the specialized world of bonds).

http://ww2.dowtheoryletters.com/ ... dia/body_bonds.html

Mr.Business

Dow Theory Letters的文章。。。

Fixed Income and Interest Rates

FIXED INCOME AND INTEREST RATES: In talking to my 23 year-old son, Ryan, about a certain preferred stock, I realized that he did not understand interest rates. And in talking to other subscribers, I've been surprised to learn how many subscribers shared Ryan's er ? lack of understanding about rates.

So here goes. Let's take a preferred stock that pays a fixed dividend of $2.50 annually. Year in and year out that preferred stock will pay $2.50. But the price of the stock itself will fluctuate. One month the stock will sell for 35 dollars, a year later it will sell for 40, and five years later it will sell for 27 dollars. But the stock will always pay the same amount, $2.50 a year.

Then why does the market price of this stock fluctuate? The price of this preferred stock fluctuates because it is influenced by prevailing outside interest rates.

One major factor in changing interest rates is inflation. Inflation is brought on by governments that create money. If too much money is created by the Federal Reserve, then those excess dollars drive up the price of goods. As the price of goods rises, it requires MORE DOLLARS to buy the same items. This is price inflation. In price inflation it costs you $2.00 to buy a certain loaf of bread. Six months later it costs you $2.25 to buy that same loaf of bread.

Buyers of fixed income securities are not protected when inflation arrives. Unlike common stocks, which theoretically can raise their dividends during inflationary times, the buyer or owner of the preferred stock (discussed above) cannot raise its dividend. Thus, the price of that preferred stock, which pays a steady $2.50, will suffer during inflation.

The preferred stock will not be able to raise its dividend during inflation so how does it adjust? It adjusts by changing its price on the open market.

As inflation increases, the preferred stock will decline in price. It will decline because that fixed dividend of $2.50 is worth less and less in terms of purchasing power. Let's say the price of the stock is 35 on the open market. At that price the stock will yield 7.14% ($.50 divided by 35). Next, inflation heats up and the price of the stock drops to 30. At 30, still with that same fixed $2.50 dividend the yield rises to 8.3% ($2.50 divided by 30). Thus the new buyer receives increased protection against inflation because he's getting a higher yield for his money.

But then a recession sets in and inflation drops to almost zero. That $2.50 dividend without inflation is worth a lot more. The stock rises in price to 40 dollars. At a price of 40 dollars, the same stock with the same $2.50 dividend drops in yield to 6.25% ($2.50 divided by 40).

So you see that we're dealing with a preferred stock that always pays the same $2.50 dividend but its price varies based on the state of inflation in the nation and thus the state of prevailing interest rates.

Question: How does the person who owns a slew of this preferred stock protect himself against inflation? The only way is through compounding. He must continually reinvest that $2.50 dividend in more of the preferred stock. This compounding process will probably outpace inflation over the years.

But he must continue to compound, or to reinvest. Otherwise, if inflation continues and the person spends the $2.50 dividend instead of reinvesting it, he's going to lose out since his original investment will be worth less and less as the years go by. His investments will be worth less and less because that fixed $2.50 dividend will buy him less and less in terms of goods and services.

By the way, I picked a preferred stock as an example in this piece. But you can substitute a bond for the preferred and the rationale remains the same. For more on compounding, read "Rich Man, Poor Man" on this same site.

http://ww2.dowtheoryletters.com/ ... y_fixed_income.html

Mr.Business

Dow Theory Letters的文章。。。

Time

TIME -- Here's something they won't tell you at your local brokerage office or in the "How to Beat the Market" books.  All investing and speculation is basically an exercise in attempting to beat time.

"Russell, what are you talking about?"

Just what I said -- when you try to pick the winning stock or when you try to sell out near the top of a bull market or when you try in-and-out trading, you may not realize it but what you're doing is trying to beat time.

Time is the single most valuable asset you can ever have in your investment arsenal. The problem is that none of us has enough of it.  

But let's indulge in a bit of fantasy. Let's say you have 200 years to live, 200 years in which to invest. Here's what you could do. You could buy $20,000 worth of municipal bonds yielding say 5.5%.

At 5.5% money doubles in 13 years. So here's your plan -- each time your money doubles you add another $10.000. So at the end of 13 years you have $40,000 plus the $10,000 you've added, meaning that at the end of 13 years you'd have $50,000.

At the end of the next 13 years you have $100,000, you add $10,000 and then you'd have $110,000. You reinvest it all in 5.5% munis and at the end of the next 13 years you'd have $220,000 and you add $10,000 making it $230,000.

At the end of the next 13 years you'd have $460,000 and you add $10,000 making it $470,000.

In 200 years there are 15.3 doubles. You do the math. By the end of the 200th year you wouldn't know what to do with all your money. It would be coming out of your ears. And all with minimum risk.

So with enough time, you would be rich --  guaranteed.  You wouldn't have to waste any time picking the right stock or the right group or the right mutual fund. You would just compound your way to riches, using your greatest asset -- time.

There's only one problem, In the real world you're not going to live 200 years. But if you start young enough or if you start your kids early, you or they might have anywhere from 30 to 60 years of time ahead of you.

Because most people have run out of time, they spend endless hours and nervous energy trying to beat time, which, by the way, is really what investing is all about. Pick a stock that advances from 3 to 100 and if you've put enough money in that stock you'll have beaten time. Or join a company that gives you a million options and your option moves up from 3 to 25 and again you’ve beaten time.

How about this real example of beating time  -- John Walter joined AT&T, but after nine short months he was out of a job. The complaint was that Walter "lacked intellectual leadership."  Walter got $26 million for that little stint in a severance package. That's what you call really beating time. Of course, a few of us might have another word for it  -- and for AT&T.

http://ww2.dowtheoryletters.com/ ... edia/body_time.html

Mr.Business

Dow Theory Letters的文章。。。

Acting

ACTING: A few days ago a young subscriber asked me, "Russell, you've been dealing with the markets since the late-1940s. This is a strange question, but what is the most important lesson you've learned in all that time?"

I didn't have to think too long. I told him, "The most important lesson I've learned comes from something Freud said. He said, 'Thinking is rehearsing.' What Freud meant was that thinking is no substitute for acting. In this world, in investing, in any field, there is no substitute for taking action."

This brings up another story which illustrates that same theme. J.P. Morgan was "Master of the Universe" back in the 1920's. Morgan belonged to many exclusive and expensive clubs. One day a young man came up to Morgan and said, "Mr. Morgan, I'm sorry to bother you, but I own some stocks that have been acting poorly, and I'm very anxious about these stocks. In fact worrying about those stocks is starting to ruin my health. Yet, I still like the stocks. It's a terrible dilemma. What do you think I should do, sir?"

Without hesitating Morgan said, "Young man, sell to the sleeping point."

The lesson is the same. There's no substitute for acting. In the business of investing or in the business of life, thinking is not going to do it for you. Thinking is just rehearsing. You must learn to act.

That's the single most important lesson that I've learned in this business.

Again, and I've written about this episode before, a very wealthy and successful investor once said to me, "Russell, do you know why stock brokers never become rich in this business?"

I confessed that I didn't know. He explained, "They don't get rich because they never believe their own bullshit."

Again, it's the same lesson. If you want to make money (or get rich) in a bull market, thinking and talking isn't going to do it. You've got to buy stocks. Brokers never do that. Do you know one broker who has?

A painful lesson. Back in 1991 when we had a perfect opportunity, we could have ended Saddam Hussein's career, and we could have done it with ease. But those in command, for political reasons, didn't want to face the adverse publicity of taking additional US casualties. So we stopped short, and Saddam was home free. We were afraid to act. And now we're dealing with that failure to act with another and messier war.

In my own life many of the mistakes I've made have come because I forgot or ignored the "acting lesson". Thinking is rehearsing, and I was rehearsing instead of acting. Bad marriages, bad investments, lost opportunities, bad business decisions -- all made worse because we fail for any number of reasons to act.

The reasons to act are almost always better than the reasons you can think up not to act. If you, my dear subscribers, can understand the meaning of what is expressed in this one sentence, then believe me, you've learned a most valuable lesson. It's a lesson that has saved my life many times. And I mean, literally -- it's a lesson that has saved my life.

http://ww2.dowtheoryletters.com/ ... ia/body_acting.html

四伯爽

（此篇文章版权归作者曹仁超）

大鱷再襲擊亞洲
10月16日，周四。恒生指數最低見14578.54，並以15230.52全日高位收市，跌767.78，成交643.2億元。10月期指收 14975點，跌965點。呢個情況發出二種訊號：一、期指倒掛，後市睇淡？二、10月10日低位14398點未破，仍有一線生機？

南韓成首個目標
瑞銀獲注資逾600億美元（60億瑞郎嚟自政府，然後成立一個600億美元基金向瑞銀收購有毒債券）；瑞信則向私人投資者集資100億瑞郎。消息令瑞銀一度跌10％，收報20.52瑞郎，升2.2％；瑞信一度跌9.2％，收報45.3瑞郎，跌1.3％。經過上述交易後，瑞銀已解除所有有問題債券。由於第三季瑞銀被客戶提走493億瑞郎後變得好弱，經過呢次注資後，瑞士政府持有瑞銀9.3％股權及令財政狀況變回穩健。

滬深三百指數回落4.88％，收1820.9。

全球財富（股票、債券、存款及房地產）喺過去六個月冇咗10％或250萬億美元（其中60萬億美元係美國人所有，佔總數25％）。

根據TIME.com嘅數字，今年首九個月對沖基金蝕咗3000億美元，散戶可阿Q一番（連專家都損失慘重）。其中Tontine Partners管理嘅100億美元蝕咗65％。換言之，去年11月至今，專業投資者及超級大戶虧損嘅百分比，遠遠超過一般散戶。大部分大戶財富喺過去十二個月市值減半，至60％；不過，人地有2000億元身家，冇咗1000億元仲有1000億元，因此只係心痛，絕唔影響日常生活。

未來打擊嚟自信貸違約（credit default）及Liquidity問題漸漸變成Liquidation償還能力問題。

1929 年9月道指見381.17，跌到11月198.69，跌幅達到47.87％，然後反彈至1930年5月294.07，升48％，再回落到1930年12月 157.51，跌幅達47％，之後再反彈至1931年2月194.36，上升23.39％，然後又跌至12月73.79，下跌62.03％，再反彈至 1932年2月88.78，升20％，之後才再回落到1932年6月41.22，才結束呢次熊市。換言之，喺華爾街大危機中，股市每回落50％左右便反彈 20%至25％，之後又再回落。

1932年6月九千一百九十四隻上市公司中，有八百七十六隻市價唔及公司手上嘅現金；你話怪唔怪？

SAC Capital Advisors（管理資產達140億美元）嘅Steven Cohen、管理Millennium Partner Fund嘅Israel Englander及John Paulson（次按危機中大量拋空者）最近接受《華爾街日報》訪問時不約而同都認為，家吓最少保持50％現金喺手至今年年底為止。並冇喺近期大量入市（佢地係今年投資市場少數大贏家）。雖然佢地嘅睇法唔一定正確，但站喺贏家方面睇問題係我老曹嘅習慣。

今日南韓圜一天之內回落12％，即今年內已下跌30％，因標普將Kookmin銀行及六間金融機構嘅信用評估降級。南韓外滙儲備只有2397億美元，即干預能力好有限。《孫子兵法》指出，以自己強項攻對方弱項，1997年亞洲金融風暴最先被攻破防線嘅係泰國，呢一次國際大鱷搵南韓做對象，南韓第二大銀行Woori跌9.3％、Korea Exchange銀行跌7.1％及樂天百貨（當地最大百貨集團）跌8.6％。睇嚟韓戰又開始！

香港人強馬壯，外資暫時唔會攻擊，直到東南亞國家紛紛失守，最後先攻打香港（因為香港係亞太區中最堅固嘅堡壘）；加上白頭任同煲呔曾早有經驗，希望立法會議員唔好貪口爽叫白頭任辭職，正係聞戰鼓思良將，家吓港人極需要白頭任在位！至於港人可唔可以團結一致，槍桿子一致對外，木宰羊。因社會早已分化為20／80；冷靜及理性投資者愈嚟愈少，動不動上街嘅人卻愈嚟愈多，令人嘆氣。

過去英國人踫頭係「今日天氣，哈哈！」；今年全人類踫頭講嘅係金融外滙、油價及金價，世界真係變咗。當保爾森大聲話：America is a strong nation時先令人驚！當美國強盛時，邊度使美國官員話畀人知？例如李實發會唔會話畀人知自己有錢？危機成因係過度槓桿化造成嘅資產泡沫及信貸泡沫，當進入去槓桿化，自然引發資產值萎縮，至今大約只完成三分一。展望明年衰退已好肯定，擔心同時出現通縮。隨住金融自由化，控制信貸早已係槓桿。而唔係聯儲局！過去一年聯儲局向金融系統注入1.5萬億美元，但CDO市場過去一年冇咗15萬億美元（由65萬億跌至50萬億美元），係聯儲局注入資金嘅十倍！信貸市場壓碎，令樓市、股市、油市、金市最後係債市價格急跌；當利率降至1厘或以下時，聯儲局連對抗通縮能力都冇埋。1933年後，美國人已唔知乜嘢係通縮，喺2000至02年曾一度擔心通縮出現；只有日本人同港人才真正捱過通縮期。

投資專家Julian Robertson以800萬美元為基礎，並增長到220億美元，去年接受CNBC訪問時話，美國正進入漫長衰退期，可能長達十至十五年。今年10月1日修正，認為自己太低估呢次金融海嘯威力。

美國9月零售減少1.2％，至3755億美元，係2005年8月以嚟最大跌幅（第三季GDP喺10月30日公布，估計只上升0.1％）；9月生產價格指數跌0.4％（8月跌0.9％），較去年同期仍升8.7％。存貨上升0.3％，睇嚟美國正一步步走向衰退。

四伯爽

衍生產品監管有問題
次按危機對美國金融系統、經濟及社會最終影響係點，家吓仲未知道。呢個危機令整個美國反思過去數十年情況，即1932年後美國政府引入凱恩斯理論，由政府帶頭刺激經濟，直到七十年代引發惡性通脹先放棄。八十年代鐵娘子及列根總統採納佛利民嘅貨幣學派，主張小政府大市場。到咗九十年代，西方金融產生新產品（例如CDO）變成冇王管。寬鬆貨幣政策；加上不斷創新嘅金融產品，令人們進入可以免首期貸款買樓時代，隨意購買電子或汽車（簽卡），形成收入有限，甚至冇收入嘅人亦可以住大屋及買靚車。透過樓價升值去支付開支，令美國家庭負債由1974年6800億元，升至去年年底14萬億美元，平均每七年翻一番。平均每個美國家庭擁有十三張信用卡，其中40％只還最低還款額（1970年係6％）；甚至鎮政府、市政府、省政府及聯邦政府都唔使增加稅收，只發債券去增加開支，令國債由1990年3萬億美元，升至去年10.2萬億美元；今年升幅更大。喺格蛇管理嘅時代，無論1987年10月股災、2000年科網股泡沫爆破或「九．一一慘劇」都係透過減息兼增加貨幣供應去解決，呢個係著名嘅Greenspan Put！造成美國由1982年至今冇衰退（GDP連續兩季負增長）。經過咁長時間嘅借債度日，造成金融業過分膨脹，美國精英流向非生產性金融業，資金用作興建物業，而唔係生財工具。喺咁嘅環境下，一旦陷入衰退，恐怕日子都唔會短！

原則上，金融衍生產品係作為金融避險工具，但呢次次按危機中卻取得反效果；愈係設計精妙複雜嘅產品，其破壞力愈大，有人甚至認為應禁止發售衍生產品。1987年10月香港股災成因係推出期指，因監管不足令期指孖展金額唔夠；加上期交所本身資金不足，要香港政府注資19億元先完成交收。到咗家吓，期指一天之內升降1000、2000點亦唔再闖禍。換言之，唔係期指問題，而係監管上出錯，衍生產品本身冇問題，問題出喺冇官方機構監管。甚至係監管跟唔上。

次按危機出現後，人們才發覺投資銀行不能單獨存在，因為佢本身冇穩定流動性支持，一旦面對較大虧損，客戶提走資金就出問題。次按危機後，美國投資銀行已同傳統銀行合併，解決咗流動性問題（或引入大量資金作為流動性）。

北京科技大學經濟與管理學院教授趙曉認為，美國呢場金融風暴背後隱藏係美國文化危機；即個人主義、享樂主義及先使未來錢習慣，係咪同中國人所講──出得嚟行，就預咗要還？以美國汽車廠為例，60%至80％利潤嚟自汽車分期付款利息，而唔係銷售汽車。當人們還唔起汽車分期付款危機便爆發！

冰島已melted down，政府為挽救三大銀行，令每一個市民負債50萬美元（美國人唔好笑，你地只係五十步笑一百步）！當每個人負債50萬美元後，只係每年利息支出，已吃掉冰島市民大部分收入，點樣還得清？

Financial Reckoning Day認為，如美國採用日本政府九十年代方法去應付金融危機，估計到2012年道指得番4000點。

過去二十五年（1982年10月至2007年10月）道指每年平均回報率12.1％；去年10月至今道指雖然已回落40％，但過去二十七年投資回報仍上升十倍或每年9.7％；上述調整幅度各位認為係咪足夠？

美國今年6月底未售出住宅四百九十萬間或十二個月供應量，上述水平係1981年以嚟最大；新屋合約動工係十七年內最低，簡單家庭房屋售價仲係收入嘅三點四倍，長期平均價只係二點九一倍，如要重返平均價，美國樓價仍需回落17％（上述未計因衰退而令美國人收入下降）。

一年前嘅今天，投資者喺山頂上歡呼；一年後大部分投資者喺深淵中痛哭及徬徨，唔少人喺度問：「恒指幾時重返32000點？」

Mr.Business

曹sir金句

女性對理財知識的需要較男性更大，因為在家靠父、出嫁從夫、老來從子的日子已一去不返。
－－2007年10月2日, 國慶港人愛國企

投資亦一樣有時贏、有時輸、有時略有損失，但不能全軍盡墨。三十歲前要博，六十歲後要穩。年輕時資金少、智慧唔多，只有勇氣多，因此要博；年紀大左、資金多左、智慧多左，反而勇氣少左，因此要穩，因為已經輸唔起。
－－2007年10月3日, 極度超買再超買

可以改變你一生命運的係二線股（明日的藍籌股），唔係今天的藍籌股，策略係「狠、忍、準」，一旦睇得準，便要忍，一如鯊魚（死咬住唔放）般狠！
－－2007年10月5日, 敲敲冷馬又如何

千變萬變最後離不開真實，就係P/E八到十二倍係偏低、十二倍到十八倍合理、十八倍到二十二倍偏高，一旦超過二十二倍，便必須企業純利保持高增長（例如連續幾年每年純利上升30％或以上），而上述情況通常唔能夠維持超過三年，亦係泡沫由形成到爆破好少超過三年的理由。
－－2007年10月8日, 龍捲風吹起大笨象

投資二線股策略係Double或虧損15％離場，但唔好感情用事。勝敗乃兵家常事，千萬不可有輸唔起心態。
－－2007年10月12日, 港股成吸金機器

人人皆知擲銀幣最後結果一定係50％公、50％字。非理性投資者可以不斷擲銀仔，加上嚴守止蝕唔止賺，令贏面提升至75％；反之，理性投資者因擔心輸而唔擲，最後忍唔住手才擲，輸的機會同樣係50％。
－－2007年10月15日, 太理性坐失良機

我老曹一早已發現財富獲得唔係來自辛勤工作，而係來自聰明投資策略。
－－2007年10月20日, A股基民搶購QDII基金

賺大錢需要的環境，就係股價在合理價（normal range）之外上下擺動，情況有如河流在暴雨之後暴漲一樣澎湃，但堤壩面臨河水暴漲帶來威脅，一旦崩堤便成災。
－－2007年10月23日, 賺咗指數唔賺錢

太早睇淡或太早睇好都係死罪，Timing is everything。
－－2007年10月25日, 有機會重返50天線

今天股票市場再唔係行人路（讓各位漫步），而係競技場—鬥智兼鬥眼光的地方。
－－2007年10月31日, 08大勢— 科技股

我老曹1968年年底入行至今快三十九年矣，請問股市幾時有「理性」過？股價從來唔係偏高就係偏低，往往在Boom & Bust之間來回擺動。
－－2007年11月1日, 好，仲有更好！

成功與失敗、賺錢與虧損往往只係一線之差，一切由小小一個洞察力（insight）開始，就係過去三十年我老曹一再強調要洞燭先機，而唔係勤力過人。
－－2007年11月2日, 美國出現三低三高

投資就係找尋明天的大贏家；我老曹近十年早已採用呢個投資策略，即Asset and Sector Allocation Model。利用資產分配及行業盛衰去制定自己投資大方向。
－－2007年11月3日, 科學化投資策略

市場往往由一個極端走向另一極端，並冇合理價。
－－2007年11月7日, 美國好快第三次減息

我地已唔需要大牛市去賺錢，而係努力去射中牛眼，追求100％回報（或跌15％離場）。
－－2007年11月8日, 努力射中牛眼

唔係所有投資都會增長，割掉虧損幾時都要做，情況有如農夫需要清除田裏雜草，讓禾稻長得更好道理一樣。
－－2007年11月10日, 港股一D都唔貴

每一個投資者都希望坐股市尾班車走（賺盡每一分錢）。可惜當尾班車開走時，經常仲有大批人留在月台上，未有及時上車。
－－2007年11月17日, 內房股一舉三得

當富豪們花一億幾千萬元購入所謂現代藝術品之時，通常亦係股票市場見頂日子。
－－2007年11月20日, 明年可能見負利率

尋底係高危動作，除非你有四叔咁雄厚資本就例外。
－－2007年11月24日, 抽新股遊戲風險提升

每一個Deep V都係膽小者出貨、膽大者撈底的日子。到底你係「膽小鬼」抑或「深溝」受惠者？
－－2007年11月30日, 關刀砍樹枝形成深溝

愈想賺錢的人愈冇錢賺（財不入急門）。做股票要耐得住寂寞，唔跟風，自己做功課，完成功課後等候安全價才出擊，堅守止蝕唔止賺原則。
－－2007年12月3日, 快快快火燭車到埗

作為投資者應在泡沫產生期加入，成長期持有，脹大期獲利回吐，然後加入另一泡沫產生期。
－－2007年12月4日, 大行嗌Sell啼笑皆非

唔好睇少二線股壯大速度:滴水可成洋、聚沙可成塔。今天藍籌股都由過去二線股開始。
－－2007年12月6日, 次按明年第二季解決

我老曹經歷咁多，能夠學到的，就係無論發生乜事，保持頭腦冷靜最重要，其次係sustain power。
－－2007年12月8日, 問題未解決 輕傷變淌血

追隨趨勢，尋找純利進入高增長期的股份，才係最佳投資策略。股市內的悲劇係大部分投資者皆忽略趨勢，只睇走勢，往往賺粒糖、輸間廠。
－－2007年12月11日, 牛眼投資法改變一生

追隨趨勢，尋找純利進入高增長期的股份，才係最佳投資策略。股市內的悲劇係大部分投資者皆忽略趨勢，只睇走勢，往往賺粒糖、輸間廠。
－－2007年12月20日, 人多嘅地方唔好去

股市無先知，你唔係，我唔係；但卻有成功策略，例如買乜？何時買？何處買？
－－2007年12月22日, 男士女士齊流鼻血

熊市唔係一天內出現而係逐漸浮現，資金由弱項流向強項，最後連最強項目亦回落，人們才驚叫熊來了。
－－2007年12月29日, 港股今年升37％

投資就係將你的資本去冒險，你可能因此而有所損失，但千萬不可全軍盡墨，永遠記住保本較增值更重要。
－－2008年1月7日, 覆巢之下無完卵

股票市場係20╱80遊戲，即20％投資者贏80％投資者錢的地方，如果你唔係20％勝利者，就係80％失敗者。
－－2008年1月17日, 2 5 0天線支持區

點解仲有咁多人醉心於估頂、估底遊戲？真正理由係想證明自己幾醒，但股市專收醒目仔。
－－2008年1月26日, 最大反彈可見27000點

每一個投資者入市前，必須先評估自己承受風險能力，一如參加選美女士必事先知道要穿泳衣觀眾前走來走去，被人評頭品足，如果捱唔住千祈咪參加。
－－2008年1月30日, 再減息後情況更壞

先買後賣同先賣後買有乜分別？目標一樣係賺錢，點解先買後賣係股神、先賣後買係衰人？
－－2008年2月1日, 累股票據累死你

市場一向無大小（冇大戶與小戶）之分，只有醒目資金同愚蠢資金之分。
－－2008年2月4日, 鼠年要在波動市搵食

食有時，睡有時；投資有時，不投資亦有時。每年一定有一個購買點及一個沽售點。今時今日只有耐心等候購買點出現，不然只是盲動。
－－2008年2月22日, 耐心等候購買點

群眾在轉角市出現前通常犯錯。
－－2008年3月6日, 美國政府無賴！

小心狂升之後就係暴跌。所謂「彈散彈散」，唔反彈又點可以散？
－－2008年3月28日, A股踏入熊市

別人恐慌時你貪心，別人貪心時你恐慌，唔做好友、唔做淡友，只做炒友（Trader）！
－－2008年4月14日, 三先策略

股市冇過去，只有將來；炒股票唔係炒過去業績，而係炒前景展望。
－－2008年4月17日, 做對沖基金經理好過做皇帝

愈接近升市尾聲，投資者投入的資金反而愈多，結果將大部分利潤輸掉。
－－2008年5月13日, 大尾巴作怪

Mr.Business

前文共欣赏。

曹仁超2007-12-11投资者日记 牛眼投资法改变一生

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牛眼投资法嘅宗旨系：一、每年都有唔少股份跑赢大市许多，如你放弃拣股，只睇大市方向，代表你并冇用心分析个别股份。二、上述股份可透过好古老嘅基础 分析法发掘出来，过去毕非德可以，你都可以。三、呢D股份一旦被发掘出来，股价往往一年内可上升100％甚至1000％。四、呢类股份起步初期公司仲系好 细，但充满革新精神。例如亚玛逊、星巴克都成为高增长股，但同时好危险，因为一旦失去增长动力，股价又会急跌，所以需要牛咁眼睇到实。例如Nutri System公司唔系协助大家减肥，而系响准备一餐之前，以十分有营养但食唔肥嘅东西先填饱你个肚，令人减少食垃圾食物；该公司股价2005至06年一共 上升2124％！再以苹果为例，1983至2005年整整二十二年都冇大作为，但过去两年股价上升180％，可见iPod嘅威力。好多分析员抗拒牛眼投资 法，认为普通散户点能跑赢大市？事实上系可以嘅，我老曹已向大家证明可以！有人会质疑你点可用5万元、10万元去赚100万元？（朋友，你赚唔到，唔代表 别人唔可以）。亦有人话投资二线股风险太大嘞；只要利用止蚀唔止赚策略，你最大损失系本金15％（行使止蚀），风险响边度？亦有人认为咁做太投机了。对于 我老曹而言，唔做功课去买股票才系投机，做足功课才买股票系保守投资者（虽然你一年内可能赚到100％以上回报）。难道买可口可乐等大企业才唔算投机？可 乐股价由2000年至今并冇上升，反而回落。边个话大企业稳健?!过去十年大企业股价不升反跌嘅例子多箩箩。



　　追随趋势，找寻突破，拣股唔炒市。追求100％回报一年并非唔可能，当然亦唔系容易。各位尝试响二线股中找寻十只阁下认为有机会响明年上升100％嘅 项目，任何一只亏损15％便止蚀，然后将资金投入其它九只……如此类推。利用汰弱留强，找寻明年会上升100％或以上嘅二线股。如十只二线股都须止蚀离 场，你10万元投资仲剩下8.5 万元（损失唔大）；如有五只跑出，计计回报率系几多？因为好多时个别股份嘅升幅甚至超过100％！冇人保证你一定成功，不过如你连尝试嘅勇气都冇，便唔好 羡慕别人。如第一年唔成功便第二年，第二年唔成功便第三年……夜以继日地学习拣股投资法，最终你必拥有金手指。请记住「买乜嘢？何时买？买几多？」才系正 确投资态度。希望牛眼投资法最终能改变你一生！

。。。

四伯爽

（此篇文章版权归作者曹仁超）

香港經濟進入結算期
10月17日，周五。恒生指數跌676.31，收14554.21，成交593億元。14300點係最後支持區，依家又再面臨考驗。10月期指跌 506點，收14470點，期指倒掛現象消失。後市係點？請看下周一。連我老曹幫襯咗幾十年泰林電器亦全線結業，因欠債1億元，估唔到香港經濟咁快便進入結算期（Liquidation）。

滬深三百指數升12.36，收1833.26。

歐洲央行宣布，動用50億歐羅支持匈牙利；IMF將協助烏克蘭銀行支付外債；南韓面對國際外滙大鱷攻擊；瑞士政府入股瑞銀9％去重建信任。中國遊客決定留喺國內旅遊，令夏威夷今年8月較去年同期減少38.39％中國遊客、紐西蘭減少28.54％、泰國減少26.16％、新加坡減少20.62％及印尼減少11.09％；香港升0.82％及澳門升 10.61％，可惜後者賭場開得太多，雖然內地遊客升10.61％（較估計中升29.9％少），但澳門賭場股已跌到四腳朝天，因2002年至今澳門新增三十個賭場，點去消化？甚至台灣今年十一黃金周，嚟自內地遊客只有四千多人，真係雷聲大雨點小；今年8月嚟自大陸遊客反較去年同期減少10.5％。其實道理好簡單，內地股市及房價回落，內地人揀D平價旅行團（好似香港人今年只揀平價旅行團參加道理一樣）。

上周唔少銀行家齊集紐約，去搵出破產雷曼手上3600億美元商業票據產品係屬於邊個，以及邊個係呢D產品保險商，以便被凍結3600億美元商業票據能夠盡快重流市場。嗰D保險商本周二必須準備賠償資金，形成本周全球銀根緊絀。

唔好沾手中長期美債
美國證監會主席考克斯認為，家吓嗰55萬億美元CDS缺乏透明度及完全冇監管係好危險事。如照上周雷曼CDS拍賣價計，CDS保險商需要畀4000億美元先可完成合約，到底CDS市場漸解開時，各金融機構再要畀幾多？真正數字木宰羊。即家吓問題已唔係邊個破產，而係點清理CDS問題，分析家擔心其爆炸力甚至勁過雷曼兄弟破產。

喺各國政府注資下，相信大銀行已穩定落嚟，各位喺銀行存款有保障，但唔代表經濟唔會進入衰退。1973／74年和記企業教訓，價錢平唔係入貨理由（1973年3月和記43元、74年7月和記7元係咪平？答案係1975年初和記只值1.1元），各位知道嗎？

新加坡及馬來西亞宣布，向國內銀行存款提供全保，條件同香港一樣。此舉令其他東南亞國家銀行面對壓力，如佢地唔提供全保，資金將大量流去香港同新加坡，但唔少國家外滙儲備不足，無法提供全國銀行存款全保。

今年7月17日至今，美元已升值12.5％。喺美國政府大量供應美鈔情況下，美元滙價不跌反升？唔少人覺得驚奇。背後理由只係利差交易拆倉，估計呢個情況一直維持到年底。信貸收縮不但引發衰退，亦引發通縮，亦係點解喺各國政府大量濫發鈔票環境下，金價不升反跌理由。美國經濟衰退後遺症係中國出口工業面對需求萎縮，中國出口工業不穩又令全球原材料價格下跌。不過，美元供應係增加咗，一旦進入經濟繁榮期，下次通脹率將好厲害，到時美元利率將急升；因此唔好投資中或長期美債（例如十年或以上，估計將由家吓3.5厘升上5厘，引發美債大跌）。

調查數字證明，美國消費者喺第四季計劃減少消費。去年 11月至今計劃減少消費人口，由佔總數25％升上52％，計劃增加消費人口，則由去年6月43％下降到今年9月18％，連續下跌十五個月。其中29％人口計劃減少負債及26％計劃增加儲蓄。Knight Frank估計，英國物業下跌只完成調整一半，未來仍再回落15％。估計明年秋季先完成，即由高位共下跌30％，然後再用七年時間才能重返去年高位。最受影響係買樓收租投資者，1996年租金回報達10厘，利率係7厘，令買樓收租變得好吸引；到去年租金回報只得3厘，樓按卻高達4.5厘，令樓價見頂回落。家吓不但租金無法應付樓按；加上樓價至今已回落20％，估計呢批買樓收租業主只有大量拋售，令明年英國樓價抬唔起頭。

1929至32年蕭條期，美國GDP萎縮50％，呢個情況唔會再出現，但未來萎縮3％則絕對有可能。今年（美國GDP達14萬億美元，未來減少4000億美元機會好大）一旦出現，代表呢次衰退較2000至02年嗰次嚴重。各國政府喺度努力穩定金融市場，當塵埃落定時，人們不禁要問呢次衰退有幾深及幾長？喺各國政府皆採用日本九十年代方法下，相信呢次衰退唔會係V形，應該是U形即鑊形，至於係細鑊定大鑊？日後先知。通縮估計維持六至十二個月；利率方面估計10月28及29日再減息半厘，未來再減息半厘，到明年下半年，利率則大幅上升。

2003至07年經濟繁榮，根據紐約大學教授Nouriel Roubini研究，主要係嚟自影子銀行支持，到去年約10.5萬億美元（2.2萬億美元商業票據、2.5萬億美元再回購票據、4萬億美元證券公司按揭及1.8萬億美元嚟自對沖基金）呢D信貸仲未計PEG（Private Equity Group）、MBS（Mortgage Backed Securities）、SIV（Structured Investment Vehicle）、CLO（Collateralized Loan Obligation）、CDO（Collateralized Debt Obligation）及「兩房」貸款。Roubini教授估計，嚟自影子銀行資金較L數字大40％，所產生信貸係M三倍。由於資金嚟自影子銀行，因此政府無法監管；出事後對銀行本身影響好大，家吓政府只能挽救銀行，無法協助影子銀行（因政府亦冇數據），因此亦無法制止全球信貸萎縮出現。

G7喺今年突然發現自己唔係咁有錢，因股票及樓價大幅回落。世界經濟自然步入衰退期；估計明年美國失業率將升至9％、樓價再回落15％及零售減少；衰退期長達十八個月！航運指數急跌82％，擔心好少航運公司可以頂得順。

如閣下認為大市見底必須有充足理由支持！例如信貸收縮係咪已停止？因為去槓桿化經濟（Deleveraging Economy）一定會去槓桿化股價，尤其係金融股，Mark to market會計制度至今仍未宣布改變。美國過去一再槓桿化，令唔少嘢價格上升，人們叫佢做財富產生；去槓桿化壓力下，令唔少嘢價格回落，人們叫佢做財富消失。如政府唔插手，財富消失速度將好快（例如1929至32年）。如政府插手，財富仍會消失，但有秩序得多（例如日本1990至2003年）。歐美政府似乎選擇後者而唔係前者，今天投資者已老於世故，相信財富消失速度唔會好似日本九十年代咁慢，最終可能係兩者之間。

政府插手可唔可以阻止衰退出現（恐怕答案剛相反）？過去人們相信泡沫可令人富有一樣；其實整個危機由華盛頓製造出嚟，又點可能透過華盛頓插手而改變？例如通過 Community Investment Act可懲罰銀行，如佢地唔貸款畀社會上低下階層人士。至於「兩房」不但濫貸，而且向大量次按提供擔保。

去年11月起我地正面對本世紀最大一次去槓桿化。資產價格崩潰、margin calls及股價瀑布式回落。一年過去咗，但仍擔心我地身處大崩潰初階。大海嘯過後一定滿目瘡痍，甚至即時開始重建，亦需要時間才能恢復原貌！唔似 1987年股災咁嚟得快去得快，因為1987年股災由電腦程式引發。當年對沖基金規模只有1000億美元，以及互惠基金少於1萬億美元資金放喺股票市場；經過一年拋售後，對沖基金規模仍達2萬億美元，以及互惠基金放入股市資金仍達5萬億美元，係1987年10月股災前二十倍及五倍。由Trim Tabs Investment Research資料顯示，10月1至10日投資者贖回433億美元股票基金及88億美元債券基金（9月份係723億美元，係有史以嚟最大一個贖回月）。